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USSR Report

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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16 MAY 1986

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WORLDWIDE TOPICS

ZHUKOV ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PEACE MOVEMENT

AU090500 Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 3, Mar 1986 (signed to press 19 Feb 1986) pp 101-109

[Article by Yu. Zhukov, chairman of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace: "The international situation and problems of antiwar movements"-- passages between slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] After the Geneva Summit Meeting

More than three months have passed since the memorable Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva, which was a major event in international affairs. As the CPSU Central Committee Politburo noted, its fundamentally important result was that the leaders of the USSR and the United States stated in a joint document that a nuclear war must not be started, stressed the importance of preventing any war between the USSR and the United States--nuclear or conventional--and pledged not to seek military superiority.

Important agreement was confirmed in Geneva about the subject and aims of the current Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms, which was recorded in the 8 January 1985 Soviet-American statement; that is: prevent an arms race in space and limit it on earth, limit and reduce nuclear arms, and strengthen strategic stability.

Moreover, the sides agreed that work at these talks must be accelerated, and they supported rapid progress, particularly in areas where the positions of the USSR and the United States converge, including a proper application of the principle of a 50-percent reduction in the nuclear arms of both countries and the idea of an interim agreement on intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

News about these agreements was recieved with satisfaction throughout the world. It happened that on the same day the Soviet-American summit meeting concluded in Geneva, a conference began in Sofia--on the other side of Europe--of the committees for the defense of peace and socialist countries. And suddenly a report was received: a television relay of the concluding ceremony of the Soviet-American summit meeting is beginning, which is to be followed by M.S. Gorbachev's press conference. The conference was interrupted and all its participants concentrated on television sets. And one had to be there to see the spiritual enthusiasm with which they perceived the considerable results of the meeting discussed by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee!

But in us, representatives of peace movements in socialist countries, or in the millions of participants in antiwar movements in other countries, which have very rapidly developed their activities in recent years, these results did not, of course, produce a feeling of euphoria or a desire to weaken and reduce these activities to the level of expectation while diplomats implemented the agreements reached in Geneva.

It was clear to all that accomplishing this task would not be simple and easy. In his speech at the concluding ceremony in Geneva, M.S. Gorbachev, having noted the great importance of what had been achieved, at the same time warned: "one must be realistic and frankly say that this meeting did not settle the most important questions connected with the task of preventing the arms race and strengthening peace, and there continue to be major differences between us on fundamental questions."

Progress along the path projected in Geneva requires the political will of all state leaders. It is present in the leadership of the Soviet Union. A whole series of extremely important Soviet initiatives, including those already implemented unilaterally, testify to this. The very important proposals advanced in the 15 January 1986 statement by M.S. Gorbachev have a special place among these initiatives. As regards the American side, as the Geneva meeting and the statements and actions of its leaders in subsequent months have shown, it is still not ready for such a development of its policy. More important, therefore, are effective actions by antiwar movements, whose goal is to prompt the United States to follow the Soviet example.

The task of tasks of all the world's peace-loving forces is to now achieve, through joint or simultaneous actions, a decisive turning point in international development. This formulation of the issue is understandable: after all, as the Soviet side stressed in Geneva, problems of war and peace are currently--when the objective course of the world process itself places questions of war and peace and the survival of mankind at the center of world politics--immediate and vital, and they affect the interests of all people living on earth one cannot escape from the search for a solution to this topical problem. This solution must be found. This is the will of all peoples, including the peoples of the USSR and the United States, who demand at all costs the prevention of a confrontation that could be fatal.

This is why, in welcoming the successful conclusion of the Soviet-American summit meeting, major international organizations of peace supporters, primarily the WPC, and many antiwar movements also declared that for the enormous work done in Geneva to be fruitful, it is necessary to apply even greater public opinion pressure on those who oppose implementation of the agreements recorded in the Soviet-American joint statement. They declared their desire to turn 1986, which the United Nations proclaimed international peace year, into a year of decisive progress in international affairs, a year of strengthening confidence, mutual understanding, and cooperation, and a year of effective joint action by states and peoples aimed at stopping the arms race, effectively reducing and in the future totally eliminating nuclear and other means of mass destruction.

The program of international peace year, which was approved by consensus at the 40th UN General Assembly session, provides broad opportunities for joint or simultaneous action by peace-loving forces in this area. It includes many important activities by both international and national public organizations, beginning with the international conference of nongovernmental organizations in Geneva in January 1986, whose slogan was "together for peace," and ending with the World Congress of Peace-Loving Forces, which will take place in October in Copenhagen--an international preparatory committee is preparing it.

And however much the evil ravens of the bourgeois press cawed that after the Geneva meeting antiwar movement would demobilize, calm down, and stop their activities, reality testifies to the contrary. Because Washington, since November has not only not displayed a desire to follow the actions of the USSR aimed at curbing the arms race but, on the contrary, is intensifying this race, an understanding of the following elementary truth is growing among the broad popular masses: "If not us, then who?" This is why the activities of antiwar movements are invariably intensifying and gaining a more purposeful and persistent nature despite all attempts by Western "psychological warfare" services to disorganize, disrupt, and confuse these movements and distract them from the struggle to accomplish the main tasks--stopping nuclear tests, preventing the militarization of space, and reducing nuclear arms.

People are becoming more clearly aware that the success achieved by the forces of peace in Geneva must on no account pacify us. Miracles do not happen in the world, and we are still faced with a persistent struggle to implement the agreements achieved there.

In past months we have frequently exchanged views on these questions with representatives of various antiwar movements in Europe, North and South America, Asia, Africa, and Australia both at international forums--in Helsinki, Copenhagen, and Vienna--and during bilateral contacts. It is worthwhile sharing a number of conclusions that we invariably reached as a result of forums and discussions.

The Struggle for the Unity of All Antiwar Forces Without Exception

The main political conclusion on which unanimity can be ascertained is that a phase of even more intense struggle for maintaining and consolidating peace lies ahead, in whose organization democratic antiwar movements will have to play an important role, primarily in the WPC, as well as organizations and movements pursuing the same goals that do not form part of these democratic movements and at times take different and sometimes opposing stands on a whole series of questions.

The reality of today's world is such that antiwar movements, regardless of the differences in the ideological views of their participants, exert considerable pressure on the development of events in the world arena. It is not without reason that the draft new edition of the CPSU program

particularly stresses their role. If before it was a question of three decisive forces in international development--socialist community countries, the international workers' movement, and developing countries--a fourth force has now been added: international democratic movements fighting to maintain and strengthen peace.

This fourth force is moved by a concern for the survival of mankind and preventing the nuclear catastrophe threatening modern civilization. The point is that hundreds of millions of people have realized this threat. As well as the experienced peace movements that have been toughened by struggle and conducted their activities from the first postwar congress in defense of peace held in April 1949 in the (Plaielle) Hall in Paris, there are many new antiwar organizations and movements now operating in the world arena.

Among them one can note such powerful and prestigious ones as the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament"; the American "Movement for a Nuclear Weapons Freeze," which has gathered millions of American signatures under this demand; a number of prestigious antiwar movements in the FRG, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Australia, and a number of other countries; a whole series of religious organizations opposing the arms race; and antiwar organizations of scientists and physicians.

But there are also many organizations in the West that have not accumulated experience and are amorphous and badly organized; dissipation and internal dissension are characteristic of them. Other participants in new antiwar movements are infected with the virus of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. Even more people among them have taken the bait of the false slogan of bourgeois propaganda of the so-called equal responsibility of the two superpowers, which weakens the purposefulness of their activities. But our duty is to also maintain contacts with these organizations, patiently and persistently discovering positions on which we can find a common language. Such positions are undoubtedly the struggle to stop nuclear tests, the struggle against space weapons, and the struggle to eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons. But at the same time it is necessary, of course, to resolutely repulse the attempts by certain leaders of these organizations to lead the participants they are deluding in the antiwar struggle to positions hostile to the cause of peace.

Public movements that are fighting to maintain and consolidate peace, taken as a whole, have at their disposal enormous human resources. And if mutual understanding and cooperation between them is ensured and if deep-seated prejudices interfering with this cooperation are overcome, a great deed for peace will thereby be done.

And, on the other hand, if this task is not accomplished and if the fighters for peace allow dissension between various trends in the antiwar movement to deepen, allow slogans having nothing in common with the struggle for peace to be imposed on sections of them, and allow themselves to be oriented to support subversive elements in socialist countries posing as champions of peace, the cause of defending peace and the struggle against nuclear war will be badly served.

Facts indicate that the new peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community have created a favorable basis for a new development of antiwar movements. And it is no accident that farsighted politicians of the west, compelled to treat these movements as a real social-political force, are now drawing the appropriate conclusions.

In this area the evolution in the positions of social democratic parties concerning antiwar movements is quite typical. In the fifties these parties, without hesitation, excluded from their ranks those taking part in the struggle for peace, and Attlee's labor government even forbade the entry into Britain of the founder of peace movements--the great French scientist Joliot-curie. The present leaders of these parties themselves take part in antiwar demonstrations--recall the address by Brandt in Bonn and Kreisky in Vienna, recall the recent socialist international conference on disarmament to which a CPSU delegation was officially invited. This conference took stands on the fundamental questions of the struggle to prevent the arms race that concur with our party's stands.

Thus, the current international situation requires overcoming both leftist factional views (it is easiest of all to take the stance "who is not with us is against us!") and rightist opportunist trends that lead to the subversion of our fundamental principles. Of course, in holding discussions with those who adhere to views that are unacceptable to us, we on no account reach agreements and accords that would mean our uncritical acceptance of their ideological concepts. But at the same time we must and do find points of contact on questions such as fighting to stop the arms race and, therefore, for the survival of mankind, on which joint or simultaneous action can and must be sought.

We must capably and persistently explain the error of incorrect interpretations of Soviet foreign and domestic policies expressed by certain of our partners in Western antiwar movements, either through being badly informed or out of the fear that if they agree with us, they will be included in the ranks of "Soviet agents." It makes no sense to demand from them absolute support for our positions, but on no account should we ingratiate ourselves with them or, using V.I. Lenin's expression, make concessions "on theory, program, or ideology." (Footnote 1) (V.I. Lenin: "Complete collected works," Vol 2, p 450)

In recent years peace movements united around the WPC have gained considerable positive experience in this regard--I have in mind, in particular, their participation in the Paris forum "for peace and life, against nuclear war," two conferences of national antiwar movements of European and North American countries in Athens, a similar conference in Helsinki, as well as many bilateral meetings with representatives of various antiwar movements. Also useful in this area was our participation in the so-called convention in Perugia, many participants of which did not conceal their hostile attitude toward the social system in socialist countries. Participation in this congress allowed us, on the one hand, to demonstrate our readiness to conduct dialogue with any organizations if it declares its intention to fight

for peace and, on the other, to expose those who, under the stolen flag of the struggle for peace, are inciting a cold war within the antiwar movement.

Our position, which is flexible in the tactical sense and firm in principle, has opened the eyes of many deluded participants in Western antiwar movements and destroyed the plans of those who counted on isolating us and diverting Western pacifists from the path of antiwar struggle to the path of fighting for a change in the social system in socialist countries.

On Certain Maneuvers of the Enemies of Peace

One must say that the enemies of peace, who are watching the strengthening of the world antiwar movement with ever-increasing alarm, are sharply intensifying their subversive activities against it. Dummy pseudomovements are being created, such as the American organization "Propeace," which in a short time has obtained an annual budget of 430 million and a highly paid staff of 130 people. In its programmatic document the leaders of this organization made it quite clear that their aim was to incite the peoples of the USSR and other socialist countries to struggle against their governments. Similar organizations have also been created in Britain (incidentally, with direct assistance from the British government).

At the same time attention must be drawn to the fact that officials of certain antiwar movements opposing the arms race jointly or simultaneously with us have been forced, clearly not without external pressure, to withdraw from participation in the struggle for peace. We recently received a letter from Britain from an active figure in an influential antiwar movement, which said:

"I must inform you with regard that I left my post on 31 October. The reasons for this are complicated, but I must say with disappointment that conducting intensive work in the sphere of east-west relations currently, particularly in Great Britain, face serious difficulties. I hope that Soviet peace supporters fully understand this reasoning."

The author of this letter stressed that he "adheres as before to the course of disarmament, detente, peace, and friendship between all people; "that the need for this is greater than ever before"; that "many of our joint projects have outlined a distinct and infallible path to achieving peace"; that he would continue this work and believes that the Soviet peace movement will find other forms of cooperation with him. But the fact remains: This person was clearly removed from the leadership of an antiwar organization and a new leader, as the author of the letter stresses, has not been appointed.

We also received a letter from the leader of another influential British antiwar organization who a few months ago visited us at the head of this organization's delegation. There is a hint of profound concern in this person's letter lest he be accused of "pro-Soviet stands."

To the credit of these colleagues of ours, they do not sink to anti-Soviet attacks. However, there are also, unfortunately, officials of certain anti-war movements who consider it possible and even necessary to publicly repeat the false interpretations of the bourgeois press slandering Soviet foreign policy initiatives lest they be suspected of "pro-Soviet" views.

The question arises: of what benefit to the cause of stopping the arms race could be an article by (Mary Caldor), an official of the "Movement for European Nuclear Disarmament," demagogically entitled "Gorbachev Will Not Succeed in Leading Astray (!) the Netherlands," which repeats the false arguments of "psychological warfare" services that dismiss out of hand Soviet peace initiatives and try to discredit the significance of our unilateral steps?

For instance, the article abounds in the following demagogic, deliberately false, and unsubstantiated phrases:

"Gorbachev's proposal can be viewed in some respects as a backward step (!) compared to the positions of the START talks (this is what the Americans call the previous talks on strategic missiles.--Yu.Zh)"

Or: "If, for instance, the Soviet Union had agreed to the "zero option" proposed by Reagan in November 1981, the deployment of cruise and pershing missiles may not have happened." As is known, this "zero option" meant the USSR offering to destroy all its intermediate-range missiles, created as a counterbalance to American forward-based nuclear weapons in Europe and intermediate-range nuclear forces belonging to Britain and France, while all these U.S. and NATO weapons would remain untouched.

This distinctly expressed anti-Soviet political trend by these officials cannot, of course, remain unexposed and unrefuted. When we meet them face to face at various international forums and also in our press, we have the right--and, moreover, are obliged--to convincingly expose the true essence of their statements, which simply reproduce the false arguments of American propaganda. This does not mean, of course, that the label of American agents should be pinned on them, but one can and should at least mention the strange correspondence of their positions with the positions taken by the U.S. leaders and their propaganda apparatus.

Our Immediate Tasks

I would like in conclusion to express a few thoughts about the immediate tasks of Soviet peace supporters, who support the extension of the ranks of participants in the antiwar struggle at the contemporary stage and their unity on a principled basis.

/First./ The situation taking shape in the world prescribes for us and all contemporary peace-loving forces the necessity not to rest content and wait for peace to be maintained and consolidated solely by efforts at the state level. The peace initiatives of socialist states as well as a number of

other peace-loving countries must be strengthened by the actions of mass antiwar movements and must rely on the active and distinctly expressed wishes of the peoples.

We, Soviet peace supporters, must in the future actively display our wish for peace and demonstrate nationwide support for the peace-loving policies of the CPSU and the Soviet state by mass actions. But it is not simply a matter of walking with banners, torches, and slogans of a general nature. Purposeful and aggressive demonstrations are needed on concrete grounds and with concrete formulations of tasks that are topical precisely today, now.

I will cite an example. We maintain the slogan: "No nuclear weapons in Europe--neither in the West nor in the East! No nuclear weapons anywhere in the world!" But now, when the USSR has adopted a whole series of unilateral measures in this area that have gained support throughout the world, we not only have a moral right but a duty to resolutely demand that the United States and NATO follow this example and, if they do not do this, show that they are thereby taking upon themselves the responsibility for the possibility of a new round of the arms race.

/Second./ We must more extensively and graphically popularize the idea that the duty of every person to whom the cause of peace is dear is not only to speak in its defense, but to make effective efforts at his work place aimed at ensuring the economic might of our state, which is a lasting guarantee of peace.

USSR working people have found a concrete form for these effective efforts--I have in mind the labor peace watches, when people declare days of antiwar struggle as days of shock labor; moreover many of them transfer the capital earned on these days to the peace fund. Of course, these acts are done on an exclusively voluntary basis. But here is a concrete fact: During the week of mass action for disarmament in October 1985, three times more contributions were received than in other weeks.

In this connection one should think about expanding our infrastructure. There are now 120 local committees for the defense of peace operating in the USSR that basically work on a voluntary basis. They are doing enormous work. But is it not time to go further, to begin creating groups of peace supporters at least at larger enterprises, scientific institutes, and certain rural regions that would do appropriate work?

/Third./ It is quite necessary to more widely enlist major Soviet scientists, physicians, teachers, athletes, and cultural figures to systematically work on problems of disarmament, prepare major proposals, and cooperate with their colleagues in the capitalist world in the struggle for peace. We have enormous resources here. For instance, look at the success achieved by our physicians: their activities received such widespread recognition that the international organization headed by Soviet academician Chazov and American physician Town was awarded the nobel prize.

/Fourth./ The longer it goes on, the more actively are all our public organizations and movements involved in the struggle for peace. And here we have, it seems to me, great undeveloped virgin lands.

The Soviet committee for the defense of peace does not, of course, aspire to guide the activities of all these organizations in the sphere of the peace struggle. These organizations themselves draw up their plans and act in this important area according to their specific nature. Trade unions, it seems, have a particularly important role in this area, and the longer it goes on, the more actively do they take part in the struggle for peace. At the same time the question arises of arranging coordination of these activities to avoid duplication.

I think that during preparations for the congress of peace-loving forces in Copenhagen, in which representatives of a great variety of nongovernmental organizations will take part, it will be particularly important to ensure the close cooperation of all our public movements.

/Fifth./ We must develop much more actively our cooperation with the United Nations, which is extremely important both for participants in antiwar movements and for it. The Soviet committee for the defense of peace has for three years now taken part in the world campaign for disarmament announced by the United Nations and every month reports on its work to Perez de Cuellar, its secretary general. He takes part in all forums of nongovernmental organizations held by UN departments. The second UN international conference for nongovernmental organizations devoted to the struggle for disarmament will be held in the USSR in May 1986 at the expense of Soviet dues to the fund of the world campaign for disarmament, which our committee will host together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The international peace year, which began on 1 January 1986, will provide even wider opportunities for cooperation with the United Nations.

/Sixth./ There is another task: We must resolutely strengthen our participation in the struggle for human rights, primarily for the most important human right--the right to life.

These questions profoundly disturb millions of people and, knowing this, the dishonorable functionaries of U.S. and NATO "psychological warfare" services try to profit by the human rights subject, asserting that these rights are observed in capitalist countries and suppressed in socialist countries. The matter reaches a point of monstrous distortions of facts, when these services disseminate forgeries according to which the struggle for peace in the Soviet Union is supposedly forbidden and in the West it is carried out unimpeded.

Utter cock-and-bull stories are fabricated and campaigns are organized to defend criminals that have been convicted in the USSR for violations of the law--they are passed off as fighters for peace and human rights. What about, for instance, the furious campaign conducted in the West for a

number of years now to defend a certain Shcharanskiy, who was convicted of spying for the United States! All this sensation is used to sow the seeds of hostility toward the suspicion of the Soviet Union and to divert public attention from the really scandalous facts of human rights violations in capitalist countries, including increasingly cruel persecution of peace supporters there.

I recently received a letter from the American federal prison in West Virginia. It was written by (Helen Woodson), an American woman and mother of 11 children who was thrown into this prison for 18 years (!) on the absurd accusation that she tried to put a minuteman nuclear missile out of action. In reality she, together with two catholic priests and another participant in a pacifist organization, made a symbolic act of protest--they struck a blow at a plate covering the entrance to a missile silo and stained it with their blood.

And for this--18 years in prison! the judges were not even worried about the fate of this woman's 11 children, who are left without a mother. A truly tragic story but no one in the West knows anything about her. The name of the justly punished Shcharanskiy has been on the pages of all bourgeois newspapers for a number of years now, but the name of the noble American woman who was a victim of judicial tyranny is concealed from the public.

And this is by no means the only incident. According to (Helen Woodson), there are another 22 American peace supporters behind bars. Prison does not frighten them. "The world needs peace," she writes, "and if ordinary people begin taking upon themselves personal responsibility for disarmament, the goal will be reached. Prison is a small price to pay for participation in the cause of disarmaments, and I gladly greet you from my prison cell."

Is it not clear that our duty requires a powerful display of solidarity with people whose rights to fight for peace are so ruthlessly flouted by bourgeois justice?

/And the main point./ Our party's 27th congress projects vast and truly historic plans for our people's creative activity, whose implementation will be a vital cause for all Soviet communists and the entire Soviet people for many years, right up to the third millenium. The intense struggle for mankind to enter the 21st century without nuclear weapons and other means of the mass destruction of people will have a very important place in these plans.

It is therefore all the more important to make the hundreds of millions, billions of inhabitants of the world aware of these decisions of our party congress. The Soviet committee for the defense of peace and the Soviet committee for European security and cooperation have already sent the leaders of major western antiwar movements invitations to the international information meeting that will be held in Moscow in the second half of March. But this is just the beginning of the enormous work that lies ahead for

all USSR public organizations, to as widely as possible inform our comrades-in-arms in the antiwar struggle for the decisions of the party congress.

These are a few thoughts about the international situation and the immediate tasks facing the movement of peace-loving forces in our country and abroad. The Soviet committee for the defense of peace would be grateful for responses, thoughts, and proposals that would help us in our further work.

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CSO: 1807/248

WORLDWIDE TOPICS

GDR, POLAND, CSSR SUBMIT PROPOSAL TO STRENGTHEN UN ROLE

LD141859 Moscow TASS in English 1828 GMT 14 Apr 86

[Text] New York, 14 Apr (TASS)--A group of socialist countries proposed at a session of the special committee on the UN charter and stronger UN role that effective measures be taken to raise the efficiency of the organization in the maintenance of international peace and security. The working document tabled by the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia notes that this could contribute to the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security.

Since the disarmament process affects the vital security interests of all the states, they should display an energetic interest in practical measures for arms limitation and disarmament, the authors of the document say. Priority among such measures is attached to a moratorium on all nuclear explosions till the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and universal prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and immediate and effective steps needed for the ultimate and complete abolition of all the arsenals of nuclear and chemical weapons and for a ban on the development of space weapons.

The role and responsibility of the United Nations should be enhanced to stop and turn around the arms race, to eliminate the nuclear threat on earth, to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space, and to use the material and human resources for the socio-economic development of mankind, the authors of the document say. The United Nations is called upon to play an ever growing role in ensuring the economic security of states, which is a component of a comprehensive system of international security.

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CSO: 1807/250

WORLDWIDE TOPICS

LOGINOV ADDRESSES UN ECONOMIC COMMISSION

LD170854 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1620 GMT 16 Apr 86

[Text] Geneva, 16 Apr (TASS)--The 27th CPSU Congress adopted a majestic program for acceleration of the USSR's development in the period through the year 2000, according to V.P. Loginov, deputy USSR minister of foreign affairs and head of the Soviet delegation at the 41st session of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), which opened here. Implementation of these extensive plans requires universal peace and security. The programmatic aim of the USSR's foreign policy is to guarantee the Soviet people the opportunity to work in conditions of peace and freedom, losing no time, and to halt the material preparations for nuclear war.

In connection with this, the attention of those participating in the session was drawn to the large-scale step by step program for total elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction put forward in M.S. Gorbachev's statement on 15 January, and to the subsequent initiatives of the Soviet Union which aim to make the world more secure. Included among these initiatives is a proposal for the mutual withdrawal of Soviet and U.S. fleets from the Mediterranean and turning the Mediterranean into a zone of peace, security, and cooperation, the head of the USSR's delegation stressed.

However, the situation in this region today causes great alarm. The U.S. aggressive actions against Libya and the U.S. Administration's disregard for the interests of small states and peoples is evoking indignation worldwide. There has not in our time been such flagrant outrage against international law and common human morality since the U.S. bandit attack on Grenada. It has been noted from the rostrum of the session that the Soviet Government has resolutely condemned the U.S. aggressive and piratical act against Libya and has demanded an end to it at once.

Alongside nuclear disarmament, the implementation of the USSR's proposal on creating a comprehensive system of international security embracing the military, political, economic, and humanitarian spheres, could become a reliable guarantee of peace, the speaker continued. In particular, the eradication of phenomena that destabilize international economic relations and of any kinds of sanctions and bans, of the threat to use methods of force, would create reliable guarantees that the legitimate rights and interests of states in this sphere will not be violated.

The Soviet Union will foster in every way the development of the process of strengthening of security and trust and of mutually beneficial cooperation in Europe which has been begun with the energetic participation of the socialist countries. An important place belongs to the ECE in the European process. The commission should be guided by the decisions of UN leading offices for the International Year of Peace, for international economic security, and for strengthening the UN role in the sphere of international economic, scientific-technological, and social cooperation.

The head of the Soviet delegation noted that the CEMA countries have embarked on the implementation of a comprehensive program of scientific-technological progress through the year 2000. Their aim is the achievement of the highest level of development of science, technology, and production in the most important areas of scientific-technological progress. At the same time, the socialist countries are prepared to coordinate their activities in this sphere with other interested countries. For the matter concerns programs with a humane and peace-loving thrust, and which are in accordance with the aims of the United Nations.

The UN ECE can and should foster in every way the unification of the efforts of countries of the region in the strengthening and expansion of mutually beneficial multilateral cooperation. The head of the USSR's delegation set forth specific proposals to step up the commission's activities in various spheres.

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CSO: 1807/250

WORLDWIDE TOPICS

SCIENTISTS DESCRIBE 1986 ANTARCTIC EXPEDITION

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English (no date given) pp 1-3

[Article by V. Belikov, IZVESTIYA special correspondent: "Antarctic, the White Magnet"]

[Text] The autumnal equinox, 21 March, is approaching to bring in the Antarctic autumn. Shortly before that day, the thirty-first Soviet Antarctic expedition will start its work with a ceremony to be held at Molodeshnaya, the central Soviet Antarctic station.

Ryurik Galkin, head of the thirtieth expedition, is about to hand over his power to Valery Dubovtsev, a veteran Antarctic traveller and Candidate of Geography.

"The expedition was brought here by an IL-76TD plane. This fact alone has broken our usual routine," Dubovtsev told me.

"Expeditions are usually taken to the Antarctic by ships, and even slight delays due to adverse weather conditions or to ignorance of the ice-drift patterns mean extra spendings and lots of complications. The thirty-first expedition was a pioneer in that respect. If heavy cargo planes open up the Antarctic route, supplies of inaccessible stations will quite soon become a quick and routine business.

"It is high time to improve the ice-drift forecasting service, and keep ice-breakers on coastal duty the way it is long done in the Arctic."

"Ice is a special kind of rock," I often heard specialists in many sciences say in the Antarctic--and they were right, in a sense. The great cupola of petrified ice exerts a colossal pressure on the continental rock, enough to make it cave five hundred metres in.

Boris Moiseyev, senior researcher on the staff of the Leningrad Mining Institute, heads the glaciological drilling expedition at the Vostok station, near the cold pole. Here is what he told me:

"The Antarctic ice crust is a kind of refrigerator full of frozen air bubbles preserving microorganisms since times immemorial. The most amazing thing of

all is that the microflora and fauna we find in ice cylinders produced from the bore-holes is brought back to life as soon as we melt the ice in special heating devices.

"The ice crust is the thickest in the Vostok area, that's why it has been the site for in-depth boring for twenty years already. Our many derricks resemble a forest. We usually do the job at night, when electric power is in excess.

"What is especially interesting is that the surface ice temperature is 56 degrees centigrade below zero, and only 36 two kilometres deep. Soviet glaciologists have drilled holes over 2,200 metres deep with electric thermal augers to reach 150,000-year-old ice layers. That's not the limit--we shall drill on and on. It'll be easy to bore a hole two and a half kilometres deep, and even more, now that we have new electromechanical equipment."

Liquid fuel is to this day the main source of light, warmth, electric and mechanical power in the Antarctic. Though there are indications that the continent possesses 10 percent of the world coal deposits, Antarctic mining still belongs to the distant future. Some attempts are made, however, to save fuel. The Novolazarevskaya station, for instance, successfully uses wind power installations, sophisticated descendants of good old windmills.

Nikolai Pitersky, senior designer of the Wind Power science-cum-production amalgamation, is member of the thirty-first expedition. This is what he commented on the matter:

"This is my first time in the Antarctic, but my firm's installations have been employed in four expeditions already. They come in very handy, especially in Novolazarevskaya, where wind velocity reaches fifty kilometres an hour in winter. It's hard to find better conditions for our equipment.

"Now, for the design and use. The six installations are streamlined generators with large two-vane propellers mounted on metal masts equipped with bracing wire. Every unit saves about five tons diesel fuel a year, and will save more as their efficiency grows. This winter, we shall test a new asynchronous generator, twice as powerful as the acting makes, and highly automated."

Today, when hundreds of Soviet people have taken part in the thirty annual expeditions to study the earth's last terra incognita, we can speak of a special, Antarctic type of personality, brave, enterprising, efficient, conscientious, true in friendship, and knowing the value of loyalty and understanding.

They come back here again and again. That's why South Pole veterans call the Antarctic a white magnet.

IZVESTIA, March 11. Abridged.

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CSO: 1812/106

WORLDWIDE TOPICS

BRIEFS

MEETING ON SEABED RESOURCES--New York, 12 Apr (TASS)--A session of the preparatory commission for the International Seabed Agency and the international law of the sea tribunal closed in Kingston, capital of Jamaica. The participants in the session discussed progress in the drafting of rules to regulate the development of seabed resources. The need for such a code is called for by the fact that the U.S. and Britain have not signed the law of the sea convention, which has already been joined by 159 states, and are sabotaging the work of its bodies. The purpose of this policy is clear, the delegates to the session said. The U.S. is trying to prevent the use of the seabed under the convention and to introduce its own, separate regime of the development of its resources, thus paving the way to the uncontrollable plunder of maritime wealth. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0637 GMT 12 Apr 86 LD] /9738

SOVIET UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION--Moscow, 11 Mar (TASS)--Tasks of the activity of the board of the Soviet United Nations Association in 1986-1987 were discussed at its meeting today. Questions of the association's participation in the movement for the United Nations support in the international year of peace have been considered. The board elected academician Georgiy Arbatov chairman of the Soviet United Nations Association. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1930 GMT 11 Mar 86 LD] /9738

CSO: 1807/250

SOCIALIST COMMUNITY AND CEMA AFFAIRS

DISCUSSION OF CEMA AGRICULTURAL REFORMS

Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 5 Feb 86 p 3

[Article by V. Kozlov, expert from the CEMA Secretariat: "A Strategy of Progress; CEMA: Degrees of Agrarian Integration"]

[Text] The drawing close to the advanced world level of development in the various economic sectors is a realistic way for accelerating scientific and technical progress for the CEMA member nations at the present stage. Precisely this is the goal of the Interdisciplinary Program for Scientific and Technical Progress of the CEMA Member Nations Up to the Year 2000 adopted in Moscow in December of last year at the 41st (Extraordinary) Meeting of the CEMA Session.

In the Interdisciplinary Program a great deal of attention is given to the development of agriculture in the socialist countries and which during the years of the existence of CEMA has achieved significant successes. In 1951-1983, gross agricultural product of the CEMA nations has risen by 2.6-fold. In possessing 16 percent of the total area of arable land in the world, the CEMA member nations produce almost 30 percent of the world's production of wheat, 70 percent of the rye, 33 percent of the barley and 44 percent of the oats. Over the period of 1960-1980, meat production has risen by 1.8-fold and milk production by 1.5-fold.

The agriculture scientists of the CEMA nations have worked out new production methods aimed at easing the most labor-intensive agricultural jobs in crop raising and livestock raising, they have designed new machines and instruments, they have developed the agrotechnical requirements for them, they have developed new hybrids and varieties of cereals, vegetable and other crops as well as strains of animals and poultry, they have developed means for protecting plants against diseases and pests and so forth.

Collaboration on all the problems and themes is carried out on the basis of agreements and treaties concluded between the nations. For studying the most important and largest questions, coordination centers as well as temporary international collectives are organized on the basis of agreements between the countries.

Multilateral scientific and technical collaboration has a number of substantial advantages over bilateral collaboration as it makes it possible to have a fuller division of labor between the countries and organizations, to make rational use of the labor of the scientists and unique laboratory equipment, to accelerate the conclusion of the scientific studies, and to save financial and material means of the countries. (Imagine how it would be if each nation for a certain question carried out by itself the entire cycle of work from start to conclusion!)

In other words, integration of scientific developments at its basis is extremely economic, practical and effective.

Since the start of collaboration among the socialist countries through 1984 inclusively, the various organizations have completed 1,161 scientific projects the results of which have been proposed for introduction into production. Among the scientific projects completed during the last 5 years were: 151 new varieties of cereals, 84 new varieties and hybrids of various vegetable crops, 143 new technologies and methods for performing individual types or operations of agricultural jobs, 97 new machines, instruments and so forth.

But these are not merely figures. The new varieties of cereals differ from their predecessors (the standards) by a higher yield, better winter resistance, and they possess good baking qualities and are more resistant to diseases and pests. The winter soft wheat "Obriy," for example, has a yield of over 70 quintals/hectare and the "Polukarlikovaya-3" [semidwarf] up to 100quintals.

All the completed scientific work in introducing them has provided a high economic effect for the agriculture of the CEMA member nations. For example, in Bulgaria this effect was 216.9 million leva, in Hungary 15.8 million forints, in the GDR 473.9 million marks, in Poland 362.8 million zlotys, in the USSR 850.5 million rubles and in the CSSR 3,245,600,000 korunas. Here it must be pointed out that in a number of nations individual completed scientific developments have still not been fully introduced. Their future optimum utilization will significantly increase the overall economic effect.

The interdisciplinary program for scientific-technical progress in the CEMA member nations up to the year 2000 and which establishes the strategic basis for the development of the economy of the socialist commonwealth nations includes five priority areas: the electronization of the national economy; full automation; nuclear power; new materials and methods of their production and manufacturing; biotechnology.

The peaceful focus of the outlined measures has been incorporated in the entire content of the adopted program and the implementing of it will make it possible in the CEMA member nations by the year 2000 to at least double the productivity of social labor, to sharply reduce the proportional consumption of energy and raw materials per unit of national income and to further strengthen the positions of socialism in the peaceful competition with capitalism.

For the sectors of the agroindustrial complex, biotechnology plays a special role in carrying out the tasks of accelerated development and this, in turn, will sharply increase the resources of food and raw materials.

For increasing the quantity and improving the quality of agricultural products, it is essential, first of all, to develop new microbiological agents for protecting the plants, bacterial fertilizers, growth regulators as well as varieties and hybrids of agricultural plants which are high-yielding and resistant to the harmful influence of the environment. Genetic and cellular engineering will be an important instrument in increasing the effectiveness of the traditional and modern methods of breeding, and these, along with the achievements in the area of photosynthesis, will make it possible for the scientists to grow new, high-yielding varieties and hybrids of agricultural crops with programmed qualitative and quantitative indicators. The new methods of biotechniques and biotechnology must play a major role in increasing the productivity of livestock raising, including the questions of the accelerated large-scale development of high-yielding animals and poultry, the development and supplying of valuable feed supplements and biologically active substances, veterinary agents, as well as new methods for preventing and treating diseases.

The questions of biotechnology in agriculture also involve the urgent task of mankind of environmental protection. Thus, scientists in this context are working out the idea of obtaining a biogas, a nontraditional source of energy which can be one of the important items for saving petroleum products and electric power in agriculture. In the future, the sphere of influence of biotechnology on agriculture and also on the food industry will grow wider.

In considering the decision of the 41st (Extraordinary) Meeting of the Council Session, as part of the "Plan for Scientific-Technical Collaboration of the CEMA Member Nations in the Area of Agriculture and Forestry for 1986-1990," over 30 subjects are to be worked out aimed at realizing the above-mentioned tasks.

The rapid solution of them will make it possible to significantly increase the production of crop and animal products, to improve their quality and raise the level of prosperity for the workers in the socialist commonwealth nations.

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CSO: 1825/47

GENERAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS: JAN-DEC 1985

Moscow FOREIGN TRADE in English No 3, Mar 86 Supplement (not paginated)

[Text]

Soviet Foreign Trade by Groups of Countries

(mln rubles)

		January—December	
		1984	1985
TOTAL	Turnover	139759,0	141565,6
	Export	74385,8	72463,7
	Import	65373,2	69101,9
Socialist countries	Turnover	80370,4	86492,9
	Export	42109,6	44283,4
	Import	38260,8	42209,5
including:			
CMEA member countries	Turnover	72788,8	77692,2
	Export	38167,3	40052,8
	Import	34621,5	37639,4
Industrial capitalist countries	Turnover	40928,5	37847,0
	Export	21349,4	18578,8
	Import	19579,1	19268,2
Developing countries	Turnover	18460,1	17225,7
	Export	10926,8	9601,5
	Import	7533,3	7624,2

Soviet Foreign Trade by Countries*

(mln rubles)

Countries		January—December	
		1984	1985
EUROPE:			
Austria	Turnover	1652,2	1663,2
	Export	761,1	804,6
	Import	891,1	858,6
Belgium	Turnover	1698,3	1439,5
	Export	1197,8	858,1
	Import	500,5	581,4
Bulgaria	Turnover	11742,4	12474,7
	Export	6124,6	6434,7
	Import	5617,8	6040,0
Great Britain	Turnover	2212,1	1901,6
	Export	1392,7	1217,8
	Import	819,4	683,8
Hungary	Turnover	8758,0	9410,1
	Export	4320,9	4560,0
	Import	4437,1	4850,1
German Democratic Republic	Turnover	14849,0	15204,7
	Export	7481,4	7651,7
	Import	7367,6	7553,0
Greece	Turnover	683,8	728,2
	Export	582,0	593,9
	Import	101,8	134,3
Denmark	Turnover	448,3	397,8
	Export	333,6	270,8
	Import	114,7	127,0
West Berlin	Turnover	410,8	408,5
	Export	311,8	259,3
	Import	99,0	149,2

* The countries are given in the Russian alphabetical order.

Countries		January—December	
		1984	1985
Ireland	Turnover	67,8	56,5
	Export	23,4	25,5
	Import	44,4	31,0
Iceland	Turnover	118,6	109,5
	Export	64,6	60,1
	Import	54,0	49,4
Spain	Turnover	639,5	588,4
	Export	332,5	235,0
	Import	307,0	353,4
Italy	Turnover	4480,8	3792,6
	Export	3156,2	2467,6
	Import	1324,6	1325,0
Liechtenstein	Turnover	25,8	7,9
	Export	1,0	0,8
	Import	24,8	7,1
Luxembourg	Turnover	14,7	19,3
	Export	7,4	8,1
	Import	7,3	11,2
Malta	Turnover	19,6	27,2
	Export	6,6	6,5
	Import	13,0	20,7
Netherlands	Turnover	1888,1	1299,8
	Export	1612,0	986,6
	Import	276,1	313,2
Norway	Turnover	209,4	177,6
	Export	129,3	104,3
	Import	80,1	73,3
Poland	Turnover	11377,6	12041,7
	Export	6070,6	6516,7
	Import	5307,0	5525,0
Portugal	Turnover	97,2	106,4
	Export	43,9	48,9
	Import	53,3	57,5
Romania	Turnover	3566,1	4225,3
	Export	1807,4	1948,8
	Import	1758,7	2276,5
Federal Republic of Germany	Turnover	7501,2	7085,5
	Export	4224,3	3991,5
	Import	3276,9	3094,0

Countries	January—December	
	1984	1985

Finland	Turnover	4733,5	4985,7
	Export	2421,2	2299,1
	Import	2312,3	2686,6
France	Turnover	4224,3	3777,6
	Export	2447,0	2174,4
	Import	1777,3	1603,2
Czechoslovakia	Turnover	12614,9	13400,6
	Export	6590,8	6813,3
	Import	6024,1	6587,3
Switzerland	Turnover	950,6	951,0
	Export	541,1	383,8
	Import	409,5	567,2
Sweden	Turnover	835,2	798,4
	Export	563,4	492,1
	Import	271,8	306,3
Yugoslavia	Turnover	5822,4	6056,8
	Export	3062,2	2717,9
	Import	2760,2	3338,9
ASIA:			
Afghanistan	Turnover	897,8	873,2
	Export	593,8	550,2
	Import	304,0	323,0
Bangladesh	Turnover	45,1	76,4
	Export	28,1	41,5
	Import	17,0	34,9
Burma	Turnover	2,4	6,6
	Export	1,9	0
	Import	0,5	6,6
Vietnam	Turnover	1261,9	1446,1
	Export	1004,0	1165,3
	Import	257,9	280,8
India	Turnover	2809,5	3072,2
	Export	1537,5	1572,6
	Import	1272,0	1499,6

Countries		January—December	
		1984	1985
Indonesia	Turnover	56,9	94,2
	Export	5,6	3,7
	Import	51,3	90,5
Jordan	Turnover	33,4	9,6
	Export	33,3	9,5
	Import	0,1	0,1
Iraq	Turnover	941,7	824,2
	Export	272,9	267,5
	Import	668,8	556,7
Iran	Turnover	484,1	347,9
	Export	241,7	203,8
	Import	242,4	144,1
Yemen Arab Republic	Turnover	10,9	15,2
	Export	10,8	15,1
	Import	0,1	0,1
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	Turnover	116,0	151,3
	Export	110,2	142,9
	Import	5,8	8,4
Kampuchea	Turnover	81,4	100,2
	Export	76,2	91,1
	Import	5,2	9,1
Cyprus	Turnover	56,1	33,1
	Export	41,5	21,4
	Import	14,6	11,7
China	Turnover	977,8	1604,9
	Export	467,9	778,8
	Import	509,9	826,1
Korean People's Democratic Republic	Turnover	714,3	1051,2
	Export	347,2	648,4
	Import	367,1	402,8
Kuwait	Turnover	4,8	3,6
	Export	4,2	3,2
	Import	0,6	0,4
Laos	Turnover	67,1	87,8
	Export	65,0	85,5
	Import	2,1	2,3
Lebanon	Turnover	43,1	12,4
	Export	35,1	12,2
	Import	8,0	0,2

Countries		January—December	
		1984	1985
Malaysia	Turnover	228,8	191,2
	Export	14,0	10,8
	Import	214,8	180,4
Mongolian People's Republic	Turnover	1402,1	1500,2
	Export	1014,7	1113,6
	Import	387,4	386,6
Nepal	Turnover	15,4	20,9
	Export	11,8	15,7
	Import	3,6	5,2
Pakistan	Turnover	123,5	117,6
	Export	77,3	58,5
	Import	46,2	59,1
Saudi Arabia	Turnover	317,1	393,9
	Export	25,1	15,1
	Import	292,0	378,8
Singapore	Turnover	227,4	90,3
	Export	24,3	10,7
	Import	203,1	79,6
Syria	Turnover	468,8	508,3
	Export	249,3	319,5
	Import	219,5	188,8
Thailand	Turnover	73,9	67,9
	Export	11,3	13,4
	Import	62,6	54,5
Turkey	Turnover	258,4	315,6
	Export	136,2	162,6
	Import	122,2	153,0
Philippines	Turnover	62,6	39,7
	Export	4,7	10,9
	Import	57,9	28,8
Sri Lanka	Turnover	65,0	38,1
	Export	2,2	8,3
	Import	62,8	29,8
Japan	Turnover	2894,3	3214,9
	Export	840,0	928,0
	Import	2054,3	2286,9

Countries	January—December	
	1984	1985

AFRICA:

Algeria	Turnover	287,8	405,2
	Export	142,3	132,3
	Import	145,5	272,9
Angola	Turnover	149,7	96,5
	Export	146,6	94,0
	Import	3,1	2,5
Ivory Coast	Turnover	147,1	130,2
	Export	3,9	4,6
	Import	143,2	125,6
Ghana	Turnover	49,3	39,4
	Export	1,5	1,0
	Import	47,8	38,4
Guinea	Turnover	90,5	98,5
	Export	33,5	40,5
	Import	57,0	58,0
Egypt	Turnover	546,7	585,1
	Export	276,7	282,3
	Import	270,0	302,8
Cameroun	Turnover	21,1	39,6
	Export	6,2	8,2
	Import	14,9	31,4
People's Republic of the Congo	Turnover	6,9	9,9
	Export	5,3	5,8
	Import	1,6	1,1
Libya	Turnover	1273,3	961,2
	Export	139,9	83,4
	Import	1133,4	877,8
Morocco	Turnover	159,7	178,5
	Export	118,3	112,3
	Import	41,4	66,2
Mozambique	Turnover	139,1	85,4
	Export	137,5	83,9
	Import	1,6	1,5
Nigeria	Turnover	216,7	190,1
	Export	173,8	149,1
	Import	42,9	41,0

Countries	January—December	
	1984	1985

Sudan	Turnover	16,6	9,9
	Export	0,2	5,7
	Import	16,4	4,2
Sierra Leone	Turnover	4,7	13,4
	Export	3,0	2,7
	Import	1,7	10,7
Tanzania	Turnover	8,0	6,9
	Export	3,7	4,7
	Import	4,3	2,2
Tunisia	Turnover	36,3	23,0
	Export	31,5	11,4
	Import	4,8	11,6
Ethiopia	Turnover	221,9	314,7
	Export	203,2	280,1
	Import	18,7	34,6

AMERICAS:

Argentina	Turnover	1129,9	1292,3
	Export	25,6	62,4
	Import	1104,3	1229,9
Bolivia	Turnover	3,6	0,9
	Export	1,0	0,2
	Import	2,6	0,7
Brazil	Turnover	467,7	450,3
	Export	95,3	70,3
	Import	372,4	380,0
Canada	Turnover	1421,7	966,8
	Export	18,7	17,8
	Import	1403,0	949,0
Colombia	Turnover	18,2	26,4
	Export	3,7	5,2
	Import	14,5	21,2
Cuba	Turnover	7216,8	7988,8
	Export	3752,9	3848,7
	Import	3463,9	4140,1
Mexico	Turnover	16,1	20,3
	Export	1,7	4,2
	Import	14,4	16,1

Countries		January—December	
		1984	1985
Nicaragua	Turnover	138,5	212,6
	Export	138,0	212,3
	Import	0,5	0,3
Panama	Turnover	9,4	10,4
	Export	9,3	10,4
	Import	0,1	-
Peru	Turnover	67,6	119,8
	Export	25,0	11,3
	Import	42,6	108,5
United States of America	Turnover	3134,9	2702,5
	Export	305,9	326,1
	Import	2829,0	2376,4
Uruguay	Turnover	69,5	65,9
	Export	22,7	33,5
	Import	46,8	32,4
AUSTRALIA AND OCEANIA:			
Australia	Turnover	503,3	545,8
	Export	22,1	13,7
	Import	481,2	532,1
New Zealand	Turnover	56,5	90,9
	Export	7,9	4,3
	Import	48,6	86,6

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GENERAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

BOOK REVIEW: THE USSR AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Moscow FOREIGN TRADE in English No 3, Mar 86 pp 49-51

[Article by Prof. Pavel Khvoinik, D.Sc. (Econ.): "Reorganization of International Economic Relations: the Soviet Stand"]

[Text]

It is nearly 70 years now since the Soviet Union came out in favour of new, progressive principles of international economic intercourse. Lenin's idea that "the Bolsheviks are establishing completely different international relations which make it possible for all oppressed peoples to rid themselves of the imperialist yoke"¹ finds expression in today's programme thesis of the CPSU which stands for "restructuring international relations on an equal, democratic basis, for establishing a new international economic order...."²

The appearance of a collection of documents concerning the Soviet stand on the question of reorganizing world economic ties along democratic lines is an important event.³ The collection makes it possible to look at this problem from the angle of the new tasks arising at the present stage of our country's development and to assess more fully the continuity and consistency of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union favouring a restructuring of international economic relations on a fair democratic basis.

Of course, it is impossible in a single collection to reflect all the details of this policy, and the compilers therefore placed the accent on the most important documents of Soviet economic diplomacy. These materials show both the roots of the Soviet Union's worldwide political support for the national liberation movement, which go back to the Great October Socialist Revolution, and the growing role of the Soviet state as a stronghold of the people's anti-imperialist struggle as its economic successes increase and international prestige grows.

Even at the early stage of this struggle, when the norms of business cooperation between countries with different socio-economic systems were just taking shape, the USSR took the lead in restructuring international economic relations on democratic principles; the Soviet proposal was, as it were, a prototype of the model of reorganization of world economic ties, which all the progressive forces of the day with the socialist community at their head are out to uphold. At the

Genoa Conference in 1922, Soviet Russia put forward a constructive programme worked out under Lenin's guidance, which contained a proposal for settling world economic problems along rational lines, including the provisions on cancelling unequal treaties, on measures to combat inflation and the fuel crisis and reorganize international transport.

Today of particular importance is that part of the Soviet delegation's statement which sets out the principled approach of the world's first socialist state to the stated range of problems and emphasizes the interconnection between the tasks of economic cooperation and the struggle for peace and disarmament. In Genoa the Soviet delegation pointed out that "all efforts to rehabilitate the world economy will be of no avail while the threat of new wars hangs over Europe and the world The Russian delegation intends during the further work of the Conference to propose a general reduction of armaments It stands to reason that for her part, Russia is also prepared to cut her armaments, provided complete and unreserved reciprocity is observed and the necessary guarantees are given her against any attacks and interference in her domestic affairs" (p. 16).⁴

Numerous materials in the collection show the USSR's vanguard role in the struggle for a progressive restructuring of international economic relations after the Second World War, during the historical competition between the two world systems, in the epoch of socialist and national liberation revolutions and the destruction of colonialism. In the first postwar years the Soviet Union took the lead in the struggle for normalizing the climate of world economic relations in the interest of all countries, with due regard for

the special needs of the newly-free states. The common interest of the socialist and developing countries in the anti-imperialist reorganization of the structure and norms of international economic intercourse clearly manifested itself by the two groups of states pooling their efforts to convene a specialized UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

The 1964 Geneva Conference was the most representative forum on problems of international economic cooperation over the entire preceding history. Noting the USSR's constructive contribution to the convocation of the Conference and its work, special mention should be made of the Soviet Union's leading role in formulating the progressive principles of world trade, whose promulgation was, along with the establishment of the UNCTAD, a most important result of the Geneva Conference. This is evidenced by the comparison of the decisions of the Conference with the initial draft resolution proposed by the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia (p. 23).

An appreciable place in the collection is held by the materials on the problems of a new international economic order (NIEO), whose elucidation is a principal objective of the collection. The documents contained in the collection make it easier to understand the idea and historical place of the broad movement for a progressive restructuring of international economic relations. They show, in particular, that the NIEO programme advanced by the developing states, however, important for consolidating their positions in the system of world economic ties, is only a component of the more general task of radically reorganizing the conditions of international economic intercourse on genuinely democratic principles of equality and mutual advan-

tage with a view to eradicating the elements of exploitation, *diktat* and discrimination. The paramount importance of this general task as a necessary prerequisite for the democratic solution of today's international economic problems, including the external economic problems of the emergent nations, is fully revealed in the documents of the USSR and other socialist countries, in their assessments of the NIEO programme and the UN activity in this area.

In the joint statement of the group of socialist countries at the UN General Assembly in 1970, for instance, it was noted that they "support the idea and objectives of the Second Development Decade of the United Nations, which may become an important factor in normalizing international economic relations, but for this purpose it is necessary that its programme be based on principles which will ensure a real acceleration of socio-economic development" (p. 43). At the General Assembly in 1983, the socialist countries reaffirmed that they, "being guided by their invariable policy aimed at strengthening peace and normalizing the entire system of international economic relations, consistently come out in favour of restructuring these relations on a fair, equal and democratic basis. The vital interests of the socialist and developing countries in this respect coincide. The socialist countries' support of the just demands of the non-aligned and other developing nations in the area of restructuring international economic relations helped adopt in the UN such important documents as the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States, the Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, Resolution 34/138 of the UN General Assembly on the commencement

within the UN of global talks on the most urgent world economic problems" (p. 231).

The materials of the collection also show that resolutely supporting the progressive aspirations of the newly-free states, the economic diplomacy of the USSR and other socialist countries takes a principled stand in turning their attention to the elements of inconsistency in their external economic platform. It is from these positions that in its Statement "On restructuring international economic relations" the Soviet government rejects "the attempts without any reason whatever to involve the socialist world in the scheme of dividing countries into poor and rich ones, thus giving the socialist states and the imperialist powers the same classification on the question of historical responsibility for the economic backwardness of the developing countries, for the consequences of the colonial oppression, for the neo-colonialist exploitation of these countries" (p. 107). Whatever considerations guide the advocates of the simplified approach to problems of interrelations between the "rich North" and the "poor South," this approach automatically conceals the cardinal distinctions between the true allies and adversaries of the national liberation movement, lowers the anti-imperialist potential of the developing nations' struggle for the NIEO programme and gives rise to inconsistency in some of its slogans.

It goes without saying that there are problems in uniting the progressive forces in their joint struggle for the democratization of world economic life, which reflect the political and socio-economic inhomogeneity of a rather wide circle of the developing states, their growing differentiation. While not ignoring these realities, however, one must not lose sight of

the main thing—the coincidence of the vital interests of world socialism and the national liberation movement, for, as is noted in the new edition of the CPSU Programme, “the alliance of the forces for social progress and national liberation is a guarantee of a better future for mankind.”⁵

In a broad sense, the growing movement for the democratization of world economic ties should be regarded as an aspect of the main political contradiction of our epoch, i.e., the struggle between the forces of progress and the forces of reaction, between the new and the old social systems, against imperialism and neo-colonialism. In this context, the connection is ever more palpably felt between the restructuring of world economic relations on a democratic basis and the safeguarding of peace, acceleration of the economic and social progress of peoples, overcoming of the backwardness of many newly-free nations, and solution of other global problems of vital importance to the whole of mankind.

This is of special importance today when world tensions have increased for which imperialism holds the guilt. Much of the material in the collection refers to the present day. The early 1980s confirmed once again that the general strategical line of the foreign policy of the USSR and the entire socialist community consisted in the stubborn struggle for peace whose maintenance is the basic condition for the successful solution of all international problems, economic ones included. As is emphasized in the CMEA countries' Declaration on the Maintenance of Peace and International Economic Cooperation, “there is nothing more important today than the task of safeguarding world peace and averting a nuclear catastrophe. Priority is attached to ending the arms race, to

moving to arms reductions, and maintaining military-strategic equilibrium at progressively lower levels. These are a major condition for improving the world economic situation as well” (p. 249).

This declaration, like several other joint documents of the socialist states, contains a democratic alternative to the imperialist “rules of the game” in international economic relations and draws the lines of their progressive restructuring. The participants in the CMEA countries' Summit Economic Conference held in 1984 confirmed that “the proposals put forward by socialist countries in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, in the United Nations and at other international forums to this effect are in force. By way of extending these proposals, the participants in the Conference call for carrying out a programme of action to improve international economic relations, to ensure economic security and to establish trust in that most important area of state-to-state contacts.

“It is necessary first and foremost to achieve the practical implementation of all the recommendations and agreements aimed at promoting mutually beneficial and fruitful economic cooperation that have been worked out by the joint efforts of states and reflected in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in the final document adopted at the Madrid meeting of the states participating in that Conference, and also in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, in the Declaration and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and in other UN resolutions” (p. 250).

It should be noted that the above quotation characterizes the socialist countries' stand on East-West trade

problems which are viewed in close connection with the general tasks of democratizing world economic relations. The joint document of these states at the 5th UNCTAD session pointed out that there was no alternative to the socialist and developing countries' unity of action also because, given the present level of economic convergence between nations, it would be only Utopia to believe in the reliability and feasibility of reorganizing the structure and norms of international trade for only one group of countries, while retaining restrictions and discrimination with respect to the other group (p. 122).

Thus, although formally the collection is devoted to the restructuring of world economic ties, it contains a lot of material directly or indirectly concerning East-West business cooperation and the economic aspects of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. In many respects the theme of the collection is even much wider, covering, along with problems of trade between the USSR and individual regions of the non-socialist world, also questions of socialist economic integration and improvement of its business cooperation with the CMEA members.

As a result, the collection is perceived as a kind of encyclopedia of the principles of the USSR's external economic policy for the entire complex of world economic relations. The documents and other materials of the collection, some of which have been published for the first time, serve as a primary source of evidence of the consistent constructive course being steered by the economic diplomacy of the USSR and other socialist countries

at the development of equal and mutually advantageous economic cooperation and its democratic reorganization.

The compilers and the editors deserve special credit for the initiative of putting out this unique and long-awaited publication and for the work they have done in selecting, processing and systematizing the published material. With the present abundance of documents on international economic relations and the growing number of international forums and the problems discussed at them the painstaking selection of the most representative materials also attests to the great creative endeavour and high qualification of the authors of the collection.

So flattering an assessment of this publication does not at all mean that it is entirely free of shortcomings. We believe, for instance, that the collection would have gained much more in the eyes of the readers had it been supplied with a subject index to help the reader find his bearings among the main problems and events of international economic life. Also disputable is the compilers' indexing of several UNCTAD materials by the numbers of composite publications, whereas for accuracy's sake they should have indicated the number of each individual document, which is incidentally the practice followed in economic literature.

On the whole, however, the team of compilers and editors have by drawing on extensive documentary material ably fulfilled their aim—to show the Soviet Union's stand on questions of the democratic restructuring of world economic relations, the contribution

of socialist diplomacy to the struggle for such restructuring, the USSR's attitude towards the basic provisions of the programme of a new international economic order. It is expected that the book under review will be favourably received not only by experts in economic ties between states but also by the broad public as the collection contains a wealth of material on current international problems and Soviet foreign policy.

Prof. Pavel Khvolnik
D.Sc. (Econ.)

¹ V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Moscow, 1977, Vol. 31, p. 477.

² *Pravda*, October 26, 1985.

³ *The USSR and International Economic Relations*. A Collection of documents and materials concerning the Soviet stand on the questions of restructuring international economic relations and establishing a new international economic order. Chairman of the Editorial Board—A.N. Manzhulo, Moscow, Mezhdunarodniye Otnosheniya Publishers, 1985, 285 pp. (in Russian).

⁴ Here and further references to the book under review are given in the text of the article.

⁵ *Pravda*, October 26, 1985.

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16 May 1986

UNITED STATES AND CANADA

PRAVDA ARTICLE HITS U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 'BANDITRY'

PM171352 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Apr 86 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent G. Vasilyev article: "The Wild West and the 20th Century"]

[Text] New York, April--Alarming news flashes reporting the disasters of war interrupt the smooth flow of television broadcasts, cutting into them like a knife into soft cheese, as in a recent advertisement.

Now it is U.S. helicopter gunships flying into the region directly adjoining the Nicaraguan border where the Nicaraguan "contra" camps are located. Now it is the bulky steel ships of the U.S. 6th fleet, again setting the course for the shores of independent Libya....

ABC broadcast a much publicized interview between the well-known television commentator, Barbara Walters, and the U.S. President and the "first lady." Sumptuously decorated presidential apartments were shown. There was a description of how menus for receptions are chosen. Since the White House boss had the most direct relationship with Hollywood he was asked about his taste in movies. Reagan said that his favorite genre was the "western," movies featuring chases and gunfights and recreating the times and morals of the "wild west," and that his favorite actor was John Wayne. And they went straight into a scene from a hit movie: a courageous sheriff in a wide-brimmed hat on a galloping horse shooting from two six-guns at red indians armed with bows and spears.

The juxtaposition of news flashes from the Near East and Central America and broadcasts from the White House highlighted something significant and perhaps even allegorical. The wild west! A hard time when the strong knocked the weak to the ground with their fists, when the written law seemed not to exist, and when the arbiter of justice was the sheriff, who decided who was right and who was guilty and who carried out the sentence himself.

Do America's present-day leaders think that the whole world is like some great big Arizona where the United States with its fleets and military bases are the fearless sheriff and the peoples, particularly those of the developing countries, are the red indians, whom the sheriff deals with as

he sees fit. After all, that is how Washington is now behaving toward Libya, Nicaragua, Angola, and Afghanistan, disregarding international law and the elementary norms of human morality.

I have watched recent news broadcasts in which glowing reports by U.S. admirals and colonels about targets that have been hit intermingle with cynical discussions by commentators on the usefulness of combat actions by the U.S. military from the viewpoint of testing new types of weapons, and you find yourself recalling an episode two years ago which at that time seemed coincidental and not too significant.

The scene was the capital Hilton in Washington. In a hall on the second floor had gathered the "most resolute fighters against communism"--sullen types representing the Nicaraguan "contras" and the Afghan dushmans, Crewcut "extremists" in loud clothes from the depths of America, and Ascetic "theoreticians" from the "heritage foundation" consumed with an inner fire. The discussion was on the vital question: "the struggle against communism on its own territory" (a book with that title was being given out at the entrance to the hall). There was a businesslike and, at the same time, half-mad discussion about how to rewrite history, which is not developing favorably for monopoly capital, and how to "liberate" the peoples who have chosen the path of socialism and progressive, anti-imperialist transformations.

At that time I did not attach great significance to the gathering in the capital Hilton. The number of "extremists" in Washington, those who, in the terminology used here, are outside the "mainstream" of politics, is small. Now I see this differently. The most extremist ideas, born in the inflamed minds of extreme right-wingers, spread quite quickly now to the offices of those who form the country's real policy. That has happened more than once in recent years. That is what happened on that occasion, too. The policy of "worldwide opposition to communism" and the forcible "liberation" of the peoples building the new life is now being loudly proclaimed from official U.S. platforms and not only proclaimed: Attempts are being made to implement it, too.

The explosion of the Pentagon's missiles in the Near East, the roar of U.S. military helicopters in Central America, the White House's loud anticommunist campaign connected with the passage through congress of aid to counter-revolutionaries--all these events have exposed to the world the predatory face of the policy called "neoglobalism." The past few days have brought sinister evidence of the fact that the line toward bandit interference in the internal affairs of the peoples, who have thrown off the yoke of the transnational monopolies, has become one of the main avenues of the Republican administration's foreign policy.

Let us recall some facts. Such as the stepping up of the criminal activity by the CIA and the Pentagon against the Afghan people and the increasing of U.S. aid to the dushmans from \$100 million under the Carter Administration to almost \$500 million a year. The magnificent honors lavished by official Washington on the bandit Savimbi, who is waging a vile war against the Angolan

people. The Pentagon's outright armed aggression against Libya. And, finally, the ongoing, loud anticommunist campaign, whose immediate aim is to force through Congress \$100 million in aid to the Nicaraguan "contras" and whose ultimate aim--which is often openly admitted here--is to overthrow Nicaragua's Sandinist government. The latter is accompanied by an upsurge of anticommunist hysteria, inspired from above, the intimidation of Americans by means of the "red threat," and the McCarthy-like persecution of those legislators who are wavering in the vote in Congress.

Let us note an important factor here: all these hostile and aggressive actions, which are unacceptable in dealings between civilized nations, are being undertaken against UN members, countries with which the United States has diplomatic relations. And they are being undertaken contrary to the generally accepted norms of international law. Truly, the morality of the "Wild West"! or, in modern parlance, "terrorism at state level."

Recently the U.S. press has been writing much about the policy of "neo-globalism," which has become the distinguishing feature of the current U.S. Administration in its final two years. Sometimes they talk about the "Reagan doctrine." Let us take a closer look--what sort of doctrine is this, what sort of policy? Especially since quite a few curious reports about its essence, methods, and organizers have been filtering into the press.

As the WASHINGTON POST recently told its readers, this global subversive activity is being coordinated by a special interdepartmental committee, created by the administration, consisting of high-ranking representatives of the apparatus of the President's national security adviser, the CIA, the State Department, and the Pentagon. The "208 committee"--named for the number of the room in the old executive building adjoining the White House, the room where this consultative organ meets--"meets regularly to decide what types of weapons to send, which secret supplies to use, and which intermediaries will deliver them to hidden airfields. The committee establishes the budgets, aims, and timetables for each operation and the main agent in these matters is the CIA."

Simply put, in the dry language of protocol. But each work conceals criminal and bloody deeds--the murders, the violence against peasants trying to harvest coffee in the fields of Nicaragua, the blowing up of mosques in Afghanistan, and the planned assassinations of politicians out of favor with the United States.

The newspapers report that CIA Director William Casey is "one of the main enthusiasts for the 'Reagan doctrine'," which is aimed at "rolling back" the peoples' national liberation movement. "This man, formerly an international banker and a lawyer," the WASHINGTON POST writes, "enjoys undisputed authority among the leading cabinet members, thus making him perhaps the most influential CIA director since Allen Dulles when it comes to the formation of U.S. foreign policy. Casey has used his influence and enthusiasm with regard to covert operations in order to broaden the CIA's parliamentary interference in the affairs of Afghanistan, Cambodia, and now Angola."

According to Leslie Gelb, the well-informed NEW YORK TIMES correspondent, it is believed in Washington's corridors of power that the buildup of U.S. military muscle in recent years now gives it the ability to "act with complete freedom and determination anywhere in the world." And this point is rounded off by BUSINESS WEEK commentator John Pearson, who writes: "Reagan wants to be the first President to achieve what Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proclaimed in the fifties but did not manage to achieve--to 'roll back communism on a world scale'--".

...In the green glass skyscraper on the East River you can see reflected the houses of the other side of the street, the clouds floating by in the blue spring sky, and... the whole world. Because the 40-story glass box and the horizontal flowing building with the domed roof adjoining it are where the United Nations works. Recently clear alarm has been felt at UN headquarters. The cowboy actions of the authorities in the UN host country cannot fail to arouse deep concern among representatives of the international community. The acts of military provocation by the United States in the southern Mediterranean, the undeclared war waged by the CIA and the Pentagon in Central America, the provocation in other parts of the world, and finally Washington's unlawful demand infringing the rights of the representatives of the USSR, Belorussia, and the Ukraine to the United Nations--all these actions merge into a single sequence of actions, different in character but united by common elements--aggressiveness, a disregard for the norms of international law and treaty commitments, and total license, which Washington's supporters of the "position of strength policy" have conferred upon themselves.

Sessions of the UN Security Council, the committee on relations with the host country, and other UN assemblies have recently voiced quite a few harsh words in condemnation of this provocative policy, which is dangerous for the whole world.

No, the world in the late 20th century is not the American "wild west." The peoples of the world are not indian tribes, doomed to extinction. And the United States is not some all-powerful sheriff, imposing order through the power of his colt. But the U.S. military's dangerous acts of provocation may light the fuse of events leading to the stocks of nuclear explosives. This cannot be allowed.

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CSO: 1807/249

WESTERN EUROPE

USSR-FINLAND: TRADE AND PAYMENTS AGREEMENT

Moscow FOREIGN TRADE in English No 3, Mar 86 pp 54-55

[Text]

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Republic of Finland,

taking into consideration the positive significance of long-term trade agreements for the development of Soviet-Finnish trade, as well as recommendations of the Standing Intergovernmental Soviet-Finnish Commission on Economic Cooperation on the guidelines for the development of trade and economic relations in 1986-1990,

noting a substantial growth of trade turnover between the two countries based on the successful implementation of seven preceding Soviet-Finnish long-term trade agreements,

endeavouring to further consolidate and consistently expand trade and economic relations between the two countries on a solid and long-term basis proceeding from the principles of equality and mutual benefit,

referring to the Trade Treaty of December 1, 1947, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of April 6, 1948, the Treaty on the Development of Economic, Technical and Industrial Cooperation of April 20, 1971, and the Long-Term Programme for the Development and Deepening of Trade, Economic, Industrial, Scientific and Technical Cooperation till 1990 of May 18, 1977, and also the Protocol thereto of November 12, 1980,

confirming their desire, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe signed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975, to continue to develop and deepen their mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Goods shall be delivered and services be extended as indicated in the attached List 1 from the USSR to Finland from January 1, 1986, till December 31, 1990, and goods shall be delivered and services be extended as indicated in the attached List 2 from Finland to the USSR during the same period.

The said Lists may be made more precise and added to by the Parties in annual protocols on mutual deliveries of goods concluded in good time before the next year deliveries.

Above-mentioned Lists 1 and 2 shall not be limitative. Soviet foreign trade organizations and Finnish physical or juridical persons may conclude contracts for the supply of goods and extension of services not included in these Lists or over and above the quantities or amounts indicated therein.

Article 2

In order to increase the trade turnover and expand the range of goods between the two countries the exchange of goods and services, besides those indicated in Lists 1 and 2, shall be effected within the framework of trade between the border regions of the USSR and Finland.

Article 3

The Government of the USSR and the Government of Finland shall undertake within their competence to take all necessary measures for the implementation of mutual deliveries of goods and extension of services in accordance with this Agreement.

During the implementation of this Agreement the Parties shall endeavour to further increase from year to year the trade turnover between the two countries and expand other forms of economic cooperation. For this purpose the Parties shall continue to seek opportunities for mutually supplying goods and services over and above the volumes provided for in this Agreement, including those economic cooperation projects considered within the framework of the Standing Intergovernmental Soviet-Finnish Commission on Economic Cooperation, and also by way of deliveries under multilateral agreements which may be concluded among the USSR, Finland and third countries.

For the purpose of expansion of mutual deliveries of machinery, equipment and other goods, increase of their export to third countries' markets the Parties shall facilitate the further development of collaboration between Soviet organizations and Finnish firms in the field of industrial cooperation. It is understood that the volumes of deliveries of goods under cooperation indicated in the attached Lists 1 and 2 will depend on the performance by the Parties of obligations under cooperation agreements relating to the deliveries of goods from the USSR to Finland and from Finland to the USSR.

Article 4

Supplies of goods and services under this Agreement shall be effected on the basis of contracts to be concluded between Soviet foreign trade organizations and Finnish physical or juridical persons.

The said contracts should be concluded in good time taking into consideration the periods necessary for completion of the deliveries provided for therein.

Both Parties shall facilitate within their competence the conclusion of contracts, including long-term contracts, between Soviet foreign trade organizations and Finnish physical or juridical persons for the supply of goods from the USSR to Finland and from Finland to the USSR and the rendering of services.

Article 5

Prices for the goods to be supplied from the USSR to Finland and from Finland to the USSR, and for the services to be extended under transactions concluded between Soviet foreign trade organizations and Finnish physical or juridical persons on the basis of this Agreement, shall be established on the basis of world prices of the main markets for corresponding goods and types of services.

Article 6

Payments for the goods and services under this Agreement, as well as payments under expenditures related to the trade turnover, shall be effected in the USSR through the Bank for Foreign Trade of the USSR, and in Finland through the Bank of Finland under ruble accounts to be opened in accordance with this Agreement.

The said Banks shall immediately notify each other of all entries to these accounts.

Upon receipt of the said notifications the Bank concerned shall immediately effect payments to the corresponding organizations and persons.

Payments under non-commercial and other operations may also be effected through the said accounts upon mutual agreement between the Bank for Foreign Trade of the USSR and the Bank of Finland.

If invoices are established in a currency other than rubles the conversion of this currency into rubles shall be effected at the rate of the State Bank of the USSR on the day of payment.

The Bank for Foreign Trade of the USSR and the Bank of Finland shall jointly establish a technical procedure for settlements between them under this Agreement.

Article 7

If the balance on the accounts mentioned in Article 6 exceeds 300 million rubles the Parties shall take the necessary measures to eliminate this excess within a three-month period, first of all by way of deliveries of goods.

If such excess is not eliminated within the next three-month period or any other period agreed upon between the Parties, the creditor-Party shall have the right to suspend its deliveries or to claim reimbursement of the excess amount. In the latter case the debtor-Party shall be obliged to immediately reimburse this amount in freely convertible currency or other currency to be agreed upon between the Banks.

The conversion of rubles into other currencies shall be effected at the rate of the State Bank of the USSR on the day of payment.

Article 8

Upon the expiry of this Agreement the Bank for Foreign Trade of the USSR and the Bank of Finland shall continue to accept entries to the accounts mentioned in Article 6 and to effect payments therefrom under all transactions concluded on the basis of this Agreement during its validity. If, however, indebtedness of one of the Parties is established under the accounts mentioned in Article 6, such Party shall be obliged to settle it within six months counting from the day of termination of the Agreement by deliveries of goods, freely convertible currency or other currency as agreed between and by consent of the Parties. The conversion of rubles into other currencies shall be effected in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 7.

Article 9

The implementation of this Agreement shall be reviewed by the Standing Intergovernmental Soviet-Finnish Commission on Economic Cooperation, which, in case of necessity, shall work out and present to the Parties appropriate recommendations.

Article 10

This Agreement shall be valid beginning from January 1, 1986, till December 31, 1990.

The Parties shall exchange notes confirming the fulfilment of the necessary legal requirements for the Agreement to come into force in accordance with the legislation of either country.

The exchange of notes shall take place in Helsinki.

Done in Moscow on September 25, 1984, in two originals, each in the Russian and Finnish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

**For the Government
of the Republic of
Finland
(signature)**

**For the Government of
the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
(signature)**

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English translation, "Foreign Trade", 1986**

**/9317
CSO: 1812/107**

WESTERN EUROPE

USSR-ICELAND: PROTOCOL FOR DELIVERY OF GOODS 1986-1990

Moscow FOREIGN TRADE in English No 3, Mar 86 p 55

[Text]

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of Iceland, desirous of consolidating the mutually beneficial long-term cooperation on a stable basis in accordance with the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975, taking into consideration the positive significance of long-term trade agreements for the development of Soviet-Icelandic trade, have agreed as follows:

1. The trade exchange between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Iceland in the period from January 1, 1986, to December 31, 1990, shall be effected on the basis of Lists 1 and 2 attached to this Protocol which shall determine the amounts of goods for annual mutual deliveries.

Both Parties shall make efforts to further increase the trade, while endeavouring to balance it to the maximum extent.

2. Lists 1 and 2 shall not be limitative: Soviet foreign trade organizations and Icelandic legal and physical persons may conclude contracts for the deliveries of goods not included in these lists or above the quantities or amounts indicated therein.

3. Mutual deliveries of goods under this Protocol shall be effected on the terms and conditions of the Agreement on Trade and Payments between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of Iceland of August 1, 1953, as amended by the Protocol to the said Agreement, signed on October 31, 1975, as well as on the terms and conditions set forth in the notes which the Parties exchanged on May 25, 1927.

In this connection the said Agreement, as amended, and the said notes shall remain valid till December 31, 1990, with a possible extension of their validity, as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Agreement and these notes.

4. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of Iceland shall, when necessary, appoint their plenipotentiaries who shall meet alternately in Moscow and in Reykjavik to review the progress of this Protocol on Mutual Deliveries of Goods and to work out and get agreement on appropriate recommendations and measures in the field of trade relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Iceland.

5. This Protocol shall enter into force January 1, 1986.

Done at Moscow on June 25, 1985, in two originals, each in the Russian and Icelandic languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics
(signature)

For the Government
of Iceland
(signature)

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CSO: 1812/107

WESTERN EUROPE

FRENCH DENUNCIATION OF SEA TRADE AGREEMENT WITH USSR HIT

Moscow VODNYI TRANSPORT in Russian 15 Mar 86 p 3

[Article by E. Borshchevskiy, deputy chief of the Administration of External Relations of the USSR Ministry of Maritime Transport: "Our Goal Is Collaboration; On the Question of the Maritime Agreement With France"; the first two paragraphs are a VODNYI TRANSPORT introduction]

[Text] Recently, the French press as well as the maritime periodicals of other Western countries have published a number of articles on the Soviet-French agreements in the area of maritime navigation. The recent French decision to denounce the Maritime Agreement With the Soviet Union has been obviously used by some in the aim of creating the impression of a sort of "crisis" nature in these relations. Here the actual facts are often distorted. Attempts have been made to accuse the Soviet maritime merchant fleet for virtually all the misfortunes inherent to the present state of international shipping.

The editors have turned to the Deputy Chief of the Administration for External Relations of the USSR Ministry of Maritime Fleet, E. Borshchevskiy, with a request to acquaint the readers of VODNYI TRANSPORT with the state and prospects for Soviet-French collaboration in the area of maritime transport.

The French government has taken the decision to denounce the Maritime Agreement With the Soviet Union which has been in effect since 1967. In accord with the procedure envisaged by the agreement, it will cease to be in effect 6 months later, that is, on 12 August 1986, if the parties by this time cannot agree on the disputed questions.

In and of itself the denunciation of the agreement does not go beyond the limits of the practices of treaty law relations. Any intergovernmental agreement provides a special procedure for carrying this out upon agreement between the parties or upon the request of one of the parties.

Nevertheless, the decision of the French side to denounce the Maritime Agreement cannot help but cause regret.

First of all, this is a step, in our opinion, which is hard to reconcile with the overall positive trend in the development of Soviet-French economic and

trade ties and with the well-known traditions of constructive, balanced relations between our countries. Moreover, as is well known, the maximalist decisions which jeopardize the existence of contractual-legal acts give rise, as a rule, to doubts as to the stability of the relations and the reliability of obligations and impede the long-range prospects for collaboration. Naturally, this also applies fully to relations in the area of maritime navigation.

Of course, the reader may wonder why, actually, has the French side resorted to such a radical step. Did it possibly have valid grounds for this and had it exhausted all means for a mutually acceptable settlement of the disputed problems which had arisen? And what are these problems?

The 1967 Maritime Agreement regulates a broad range of questions usual for such agreements: the procedure for vessels in ports, the mutual recognition of documents, jurisdiction on board a vessel, the simplifying of various formalities and so forth. But its basic core is the adherence by the sides to the principles of the freedom of international maritime commercial navigation as formulated in the Preamble and Article 3 as well as the desire to achieve harmonious development of maritime trade between the Soviet Union and France.

An objective assessment of the almost 20-year total of the working of the agreement is unanimous. It, undoubtedly, has been a positive instrument in the overall structure of trade and economic relations between our countries. Largely due to this agreement, Soviet-French trade over all these years has had a dependable transport system and this, as is known, meets the interests of both nations.

As for the reasons for the relations which have arisen, they, in our view, are far from unanimous.

In April 1985, the French side proposed a start to talks in the aim of changing certain provisions of the Maritime Agreement. At several subsequently held meetings of a specially created work group, the Soviet experts constantly endeavored to seek mutually acceptable solutions, holding a rather flexible position. As a result, a significant part of the text of the joint document was agreed upon considering the requests of the French side.

Nevertheless, the talks showed that certain circles in France were insisting upon an ultimatum approach, obviously hoping that in this manner it would be possible to force the Soviet side, in essence voluntarily, to abandon a number of generally accepted conditions in international trade and navigation operating in the rr operating in the relations of both the USSR and Fran other states.

As a result the question of maritime shipments in January of this year was reviewed also at the 20th Session of the Mixed ("Large") Soviet-French Commission and in the protocol of this meeting the sides stated their agreement on the need to find a satisfactory solution. However, a continuation of the talks did not follow, since 2 weeks later the French side announced the denunciation of the agreement. Having interrupted the process of talks, our partners obviously wanted to put the responsibility for their

breakdown on the Soviet side. Here obviously we must look also for the roots of the noisy propaganda campaign in the press.

It has been asserted that the Soviet Maritime Fleet almost monopolizes all shipments, intentionally preventing the participation of French flagships in them and that the Soviet side supposedly without any grounds refused to incorporate in the international agreement the principle of equal and balanced participation of the fleets of both sides in all bilateral shipments.

Let us take a look at the facts. In 1985, more than 13 million tons of various cargo were carried between the ports of the USSR and France. The Soviet vessels carried 61.6 percent of the total volume, with around 8 percent carried on vessels flying the French flag and over 30 percent on the tonnage of other flags. Here a significant portion of the freight turned over to a third flag was under the control of the French side. Nevertheless it did not utilize its own vessels for transporting the cargo. This in actuality is the state of affairs as for the "monopolizing of shipments" by the Soviet flag. What sort of monopolizing can it be if the share of French and third-flag vessels was almost 40 percent of the total volume of shipments!

Also completely fallacious is the assertion that the Soviet side supposedly intentionally has impeded the broader participation of French vessels in the shipments. In the same 1985, French shipowners earned around 13 million dollars on the Soviet charter market. The balance of the reciprocal chartering of vessels was almost 3 million dollars in favor of the French side.

One can also not help but point out that two joint Soviet-French regular cargo lines were established and are now operating within the intergovernmental agreement under conditions of complete parity. They carry regular cargo between Riga and Le Havre, Odessa and Marseille.

These are the facts as concern the shipments. Of course, the participation of French-flag vessels in them is still insufficient. The Soviet side does not deny this. Moreover we have agreed that an effort must be made for a greater balance. We feel that with a reciprocal desire of the sides and with joint efforts, this goal is completely attainable. However, here it is important that the determining role of purely commercial elements not be replaced by governmental administrative rules or by attempts to create what in essence are special conditions for Soviet-French collaboration in navigation.

We realize that the extended crisis in international shipping has also been substantially felt by the French maritime fleet. In 1985 alone, its tonnage dropped by almost 19 percent, the problem of employment on French maritime transport was sharply aggravated and the economic indicators of many maritime enterprises turned down.

The solution to these problems, we are convinced, must be sought primarily in the joint efforts of the entire world community aimed at a reasonable settlement to such problems as an uncontrolled increase in tonnage, the monopolizing of the global shipping lines by several corporations which are

not subject to national control and the establishing of a more just procedure in international shipping as a whole.

Soviet-French collaboration in the sphere of maritime transport is an important component in the diverse structure of relations between the USSR and France. There is no doubt that there are real prospects for their improving and further mutually advantageous development. This is precisely how we understand the decisions and recommendations of the January session of the "large" commission on economic and scientific-technical collaboration. We are convinced that the disputed problems can be resolved at the conference table. Here, of course, it is essential that both sides show a pragmatic approach and realism in assessing the positions and interests of each other.

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EASTERN EUROPE

HUNGARIAN COMPUTER FIRM FEATURED AS YOUNG 'ARTEL'

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Mar 86 p 5

[Article by B. Konovalov, special IZVESTIYA correspondent from Budapest: "An Engineering Artel; A Story of One of the Scientific-Technical Cooperatives in Hungary"]

[Text] Datoplan is a young organization which has existed for just 3 years. In our opinion it could be called an artel of engineers and technicians. This is one of the numerous scientific and technical cooperatives which have been organized in recent years. Of course, in Hungary as everywhere else, the main "locomotives" of scientific and technical progress are large institutes and enterprises. Small cooperatives are, to put it figuratively, "bicycles." But they can go where track and asphalted arteries have not yet been laid. For them, the reasonable field of activity is where it is much more economic to utilize small institutions or where it is essential to quickly cross the "roadless expanse."

"Our cooperative," we were told by the chairman of the board of Datoplan, Imre Nemeth, "was established for servicing and improving computer equipment. The large enterprises are engaged in turning out new computers and we have specialized in the modernizing of old ones. Many of our customers do not have money to purchase a new computer while the old one does not satisfy their needs. For example, ferrite storage was used 5-10 years ago and this requires a great deal of power, it frequently breaks down and takes a long time to repair. We can replace this with a semiconductor memory. Disks of our own design of electronic memory can also be connected to this system. Due to this it is possible to double the efficiency of the computer with the same processor and old programs. For approximately 20 percent of the original cost, the consumer receives essentially a new machine which is compatible with all the previous software. And this is important because the working out of new programs frequently costs more than the machine itself."

"We earn a constant steady income from the maintenance of computer equipment," said the commercial director of the cooperative, Emre Elek, joining the conversation. "Our services are half the amount of Videoton, the main Hungarian firm which produces and services computer equipment. Moreover, we repair it faster."

Together with the chief engineer of the cooperative, Peter Banki, we walked through the rooms of Datoplan. There was a good deal of modern equipment and electronic devices. But things were clearly crowded.

"By the end of the year, we are moving," asserted P. Banki, optimistically. "We have rented for 70 years a plot in one of the regions of Budapest. For now, the cooperative is located in three places. When we build a spacious three-story building we will move everything together. We will have modern laboratories and a large warehouse for spare parts. The papers have already been approved. We have announced a competition among the builders in order to choose the best conditions for ourselves."

At present, the cooperative has 34 shareholders and 9 permanent employees. In addition, over the 3 years around 100 persons have been hired for various jobs. Basically the members of the cooperative are engineers, mathematicians and technicians. As a rule, they are mature specialists well-acquainted with electronics. Some have patented inventions which are used by the cooperative. The new inventions made since the joining of the cooperative become common property. A majority has long employment at major enterprises. Thus, the cooperative chairman I. Nemeth has worked 34 years at the Budapest Communications Equipment Plant. Recently he was the chief of the computer administration there.

The chief engineer P. Banki, having completed the institute, has worked since 1972 at Videoton. He was among the first five engineers of the Videoton Service Center opened in Moscow. He became the chief of the technical section of this center. Upon return to Hungary, he soon thereafter headed the regional Videoton Service Center in Budapest.

The commercial director of Datoplan, Emre Elek, also held a responsible position at Videoton, where he began working in 1976. He also worked as the director of the Videoton Technical Center in Moscow.

From these three biographies of the Datoplan leaders, one can see that here are employed not novices but very skilled specialists who have great experience.

"Your departure, along with other comrades, probably caused harm to the enterprises where you worked previously?"

"Yes, they let us go reluctantly," said Emre Nemeth. "But we endeavored to leave trained replacements and not to break all ties immediately."

In organizing the cooperative, there were 17 persons who simultaneously invested their funds amounting to 2-months' salary. Until the first income this money on deposit in a bank became the initial capital. At the end of the first month of joint work, they already had income. Over each of the 3 years of the cooperative's existence, the number of its members has increased by approximately 10 percent but turnover has doubled. Each year profit has increased by 3-fold.

The state tax for the cooperative is rather high, some 35 percent of the profits. In addition, 40 percent and 15 percent are deducted from the wage fund into the state budget for social security.

The cooperative itself decides how to spend the money left after the paying of the state taxes, for earnings or for the purchase of new equipment or construction. The superior administrative body of the cooperative is the general assembly. In intervals all questions are settled by the chairman. Datoplan is endeavoring to provide for the today of the employees and is also investing money in technical facilities in order to develop steadily in the future.

All the cooperative co-workers receive salaries according to the staff schedule. But prior to the end of the year, they receive a salary as an advance. And they are obliged to return the money if they have not earned it. So far, this has not happened. On the contrary, at the end of the year there comes a large addition to their earnings.

"We receive more but on the other hand, labor productivity of each member is substantially higher than at the large enterprises," explained the cooperative chairman. "Everything is out in the open and you cannot hide behind someone else. Everyone knows who is doing what. If you do not want to work hard, then leave."

The last year of 1985 was significant for them as Datoplan crossed the frontier of its nation with the delivery of the electronic memory for testing in the Soviet Union.

Datoplan is proud of the fact that agreement was reached on 3 December and on 18 December they had already delivered their product for testing in Moscow to the USSR Ministry of Railroads. The speed of delivery was a question of prestige for the cooperative.

The good quality of the work done by them is verified by the chief of the Main Administration for Computer Equipment of the Ministry of Railroads, Yu. S. Khandkarov.

"We have successfully tested the electronic memory delivered by Datoplan at the stations of Lyublino and Darnitsa" said Yuriy Sergeyevich [Khandkarov]. "For us, such a memory is advantageous because we can dispense with the unreliable mechanical parts of the computer and hence expensive repairs."

Datoplan has offered to Soviet users a semiconductor memory to modernize the Hungarian-produced ES-1010 and ES-1011 machines (we have hundreds of these in our country) as well as the disks for a large-capacity electronic memory for our minicomputers of the SM-2 and SM-4 type. Each of the cooperative members is vitally interested in maintaining the high reputation of his "firm."

It must be said that for Hungary the scientific and technical cooperatives are no "exotic rarity" but rather a regular phenomenon. They have firmly taken their place among the small forms of institutions. In Hungary it is

considered that they have a future. They should develop in parallel with the large enterprises.

The Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Hungarian State Committee on Technical Development as a whole view such cooperatives positively.

"Of course, we are perfectly aware that this is not the main echelon of scientific and technical progress," said Pal Bansagi, the chief of the Main Administration for Research and Development Under the Hungarian State Committee for Technical Development, in a conversation with us. "But by the small types of institutions it is possible to quickly satisfy the nation's scarcity for various developments and services and this is of important significance. In truth we are aware that the scientific and technical cooperatives are not only a good. There is also a negative aspect. They cause a flow of skilled personnel from the large enterprises. They have much lower overhead and higher labor productivity and for this reason they can also pay a higher wage. But as a whole the loss of personnel is compensated for by the fact that the cooperatives force the large enterprises to be more flexible in order not to lose their market. They sharply strengthen the spirit of competition and foster a more creative atmosphere in our nation's science and technology."

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EASTERN EUROPE

HUNGARY-LITHUANIA: COOPERATION IN MACHINE-TOOL INDUSTRY

Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 5, Jan 86 p 20

[Article by G. Nurmiyev, chief of the USSR Ministry of Construction, Road and Municipal Machine Building Press Center, under the rubric "Cooperation of Labor Collectives": "Vilnius-Budapest: Creative Ties of Machine Builders"]

[Text] The machine builders of Vilnius Production Association of Construction and Finishing Machines (VPO SOM) and the Budapest Association of Mechanikai-Muvek Plants and specialists of the institutes serving them--VNIISMI [All-Union Scientific-Research and Planning-Design Institute of Mechanized and Manual Construction-Installation Tools, Vibrators and Construction-Finishing Machines] (USSR) and ETI [expansion not provided] (Hungary) have now been working in close contact for almost 10 years. Their cooperation began in 1976 when an agreement was completed on scientific and technical cooperation and organization of cooperative production of the 7000N and 2600N high-pressure units for pressure application of paint mixtures. For the Soviet side, specialization was secured for the production and delivery of combined modular units of 20 designations, including suction systems, pressure valves and various type sizes of nozzles and for the Hungarian--two type sizes of units and parts (pumps and electrical equipment).

Both associations together with their institutes organized scientific-research work on the basis of a unified plan. Taking into consideration the requirements established in machine building of each of the countries, they prepared technical documentation and production and created new specialized shops and sectors at their enterprises intended for long-term joint work.

In the shortest possible time, the partners carried out complex research and developed a number of new components and parts, improving the units. For example, the Hungarian colleagues created safe electric motors and the Soviet colleagues--stainless steel of improved machinability, high abrasive and corrosion resistance for body parts of valves, a specialized diamond tool for machining it and 20 type sizes of nozzles as well as boosted-pressure hoses.

For the effective resolution of problems arising at the main plant of the Mechanikai-Muvek association, an employee of VPO SOM was constantly on hand, and in Vilnius--a Hungarian representative was on hand. Specialists got together for the solution of major technical and other questions. For

example, they examined the technical-economic indicators of produced machines and the volume of cooperative production, made more exact the size of reciprocal deliveries in connection with increased demand for the products and adopted joint decisions obligatory for fulfillment by both sides.

The efficiently organized cooperation bears good fruit--production volume has been growing from 5-year plan to 5-year plan. Thus, while VPO SOM in 1976-1980 produced 16,750 of the above-mentioned high-pressure units for a total of 28.6 million rubles, the figure for 1981-1985 was 51,780 for a total of more than 85 million rubles. At the same time, an economic effect was produced in our country amounting to 43 million rubles and in Hungary--to tens of millions of forints.

The machines produced by the associations have a high productive capacity, reaching 3,000 square meters of painted surfaces per shift. The machines turned out to be indispensable in performing large amounts of finishing work in a limited time as was the case, for example, at the Olympic facilities in Moscow. The new units are distinguished by high reliability and mobility at a construction site and are convenient to service. The employment of such a unit for spraying paint under pressure makes it possible, compared to traditional equipment, to reduce expenditure of the paint mixture by 10 percent.

Today the 7000N and 2600N units are used not only in construction but also in the machine-building, shipbuilding, aviation and furniture industry, in agriculture and other sectors.

The establishment of a school of instructors attached to VPO SOM in which 200 persons from different regions of the country undergo training contributes to the successful operation of the new equipment in our country.

Close working contacts of VPO SOM with the Mehanikai-Myuvek association and the institutes servicing them have grown into direct contacts between labor collectives. They are developing on the basis of a contract for direct scientific-technical and production cooperation. According to the contract, the partners jointly plan production, scientific and technical work and sales of products. They arrange for the manufacture of new modifications of the high-pressure painting units.

Together with joint development of products, the machine builders exchange production experience on the labor-collective level. The first delegation of representatives from Mehanikai-Muvek visited VPO SOM in the summer of 1985. It consisted of B. Istvan, T. Laszlo, M. Robert, F. Janos and others and was particularly interested in how the Vilnius people were working in the 11th shop of their enterprise created especially for the fabrication of basic parts for the high-pressure units. The guests worked side by side with such masters of their trade as V. Shvenchenis, A. Rakovskiy, I. Liminovich, I. Blazhevich, S. Konoplev, Hero of Socialist Labor B. Milto, the best turner in Vilnius, and Ch. Yankovskiy's youth brigade. They mastered to the finest detail the technology of machining the most precise parts of the pump, creating a pressure of up to 250 atmospheres with paint spraying pistols from new materials.

The Hungarian guests worked next to Vilnius masters in the sector for the manufacture of hard-alloy nozzle parts, requiring special precision in the polishing and assembly of the units. They familiarized themselves with great interest with the organization of production, labor and socialist competition and with the methods of party and trade-union work.

A delegation from VPO SOM paid a return visit in the fall of last year. Its participants were interested in the the methods employed by the Hungarian colleagues of adjusting and operating electrical apparatus sent to Vilnius.

In the process of close contacts, the collectives launched a socialist competition. The results of fulfilling big commitments are attested, for example, by the fact that the VPO SOM collective completed by 13 November the annual plan targets for the production of commodity output and its sale and produced by the end of the year above-plan production of more than 5 million rubles.

Today the partners continue to work on improving products, boosting their efficiency and reliability and on creating models expanding the field of application of the high-pressure units. Experimental models of the units with an internal-combustion engine operated drive have already undergone industrial testing. Such a drive will make it possible to utilize the high efficiency equipment under field conditions in the newly developing regions with an inadequate electric-power supply. Manufacture has started of a fundamental series of the unit with the painting tank located on top. Such an arrangement makes it possible through utilizing the weight of the actually finishing material to completely use up the paint and to filter and employ more viscous mixtures.

At the present time, specialists of the two associations and their institutes are working on the creation of a high-pressure unit for the application of dual-component mixtures capable of simultaneously providing heat and sound insulation together with the painting design structures. A device is also being developed for painting with high-pressure units in an electrostatic field. The completion of the development will make it possible to improve the quality of the paint and to sharply reduce nonproduction expenditures of paint.

Cooperation of the collectives of the related enterprises shows good promise. They are outlined in the protocol signed in July 1985 on extending the above-mentioned agreement of 1976 for a new 5-year period.

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LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN

SOVIET-ARGENTINE TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Moscow FOREIGN TRADE in English No 3, Mar 86 pp 23-25

[Article by Galina Kuznetsova and Anatoli Manenok: "Soviet-Argentine Trade and Economic Relations: Problems and Prospects"]

[Text]

Argentina is a long-standing trading partner of the Soviet Union in Latin America. Trade relations between the two countries have been in existence for more than 60 years, and June 1986 will mark 40 years of the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Soviet-Argentine trade and economic relations develop on a broad basis of intergovernmental agreements. Apart from the general trade agreement the countries have concluded agreements on economic, scientific and technical cooperation, the agreement on the supplies of machinery and equipment from the USSR to Argentina, and the agreement on the supply of grain from Argentina to the Soviet Union. The principles and directions of cooperation embodied in these agreements broadened the traditional framework of commodity exchange, enriched trade and economic relations between the countries with new forms, and widened the circle of their participants.

The last decade has been marked by the growth and expansion of trade between the USSR and Argentina. From 1975 its volume increased 4-fold, exceeding 1,300 million rubles in 1985. From the late 1970s Argentina has firmly held first place among the Latin American countries (without Cuba) in terms of trade turnover with the USSR.

The basis of Soviet exports to Argentina is machinery and equipment. Argentina is the major buyer of Soviet equipment among the countries in Latin America. Machinery and equipment are supplied to that country on deferred payment terms provided for in the relevant in-

tergovernmental agreement. During the 10-year period of the validity of this agreement almost 240 million rubles worth of Soviet equipment was exported to Argentina. The supplies included power-generating equipment, handling and hoisting equipment, metallurgical equipment, trucks, metal-cutting machine-tools, etc. In Argentina V/O Energomachexport participated in the construction of large power stations: the hydroelectric station Salto Grande (1.9 million kW) and the thermal power station Costañera (310,000 kW). The commissioning of one more thermal power station Bahía Blanca (620,000 kW) also with the USSR's assistance is scheduled for 1987. Argentina's economists calculated that at present nearly a quarter of all electric power produced in Argentina is generated on equipment marked "Made in USSR." About 1,500 Soviet trucks of various types and more than 200 cranes are used at the Argentine industrial projects.

In 1984 the first batch of anti-hail equipment was sold for use at vineyards in the Province of Mendoza. It proved its effectiveness, and in 1985 the provincial authorities purchased another large batch of this equipment. There is an interest towards its application in other agricultural areas of Argentina.

In 1984 and 1985 promotion of export to Argentina of Soviet machinery and equipment notably reactivated. A number of Argentine state organizations placed orders for various industrial equipment and trucks worth more than 100 million dollars with delivery in 1985 and 1986. During the same period direct contacts were established with the remote provinces of Argentina (Formosa, Salta, El Chaco, La Rioja, Catamarca and others) which gave the green light for signing contracts on the delivery of road construction equipment and tractors to the total amount of 36 million dollars. Negotiations were held on the supply of these types of machinery and equipment, some of which were new for the Argentine market—electric locomotives, ships, airplanes, etc. Thus, in 1985 alone Argentina bought Soviet equipment to the value three times greater than in 1984.

In recent years Soviet foreign trade organizations have increasingly applied new forms of trade in the Argentine market. In 1984 the first counterpurchase export-import transaction took place. Energomachexport supplied for the city council of the capital of the

Mendoza province 17 trolley-buses tied against the purchase of food products produced by the province.

Such form of trade opens up additional opportunities both for Soviet and Argentine exporters. Understanding this, representatives of a number of large Argentine firms exporting wool and grain recently visited the Soviet Union to study the possibility of buying various types of equipment. They visited industrial enterprises in Kishinev, Leningrad and Minsk, saw the production and operation of tractors, harvester combines and other agricultural implements, equipment for the food, and in particular, butter-making industry.

Such fact-finding mission gives Soviet foreign trade organizations the opportunity to find new buyers, and the Argentine firms the chance to strengthen their positions in the Soviet market as suppliers of agricultural produce.

Another new and promising direction of Soviet-Argentine trade is the development of cooperation between Soviet organizations and Argentine national firms in the production and supply of equipment. The first step in this direction has been the joint presentation by V/O Energomachexport and a number of Argentine firms of a proposal to supply equipment for the hydro-electric station Piedra del Aquila (1.6 million kW). The share of Soviet suppliers will not exceed 40 per cent of the value of the proposal, as the bulk of the equipment will be produced at Argentine plants using Soviet technology. Such form of cooperation is beneficial for Argentina since it increases the loading of available capacities, and creates additional jobs. The future belongs to such forms. Understanding this, V/O Energomachexport is ready to develop cooperation with Argentine national firms on supplying equipment for other energy projects: the hydro-electric stations Pichi Picún Leufu, Los Blancos, Garabi, the thermal power stations Loma de la Lata, Segba-VIII. The associations Avtoexport and Traktoroexport are negotiating an arrangement on Argentine national enterprises assembling Niva cars, tractors, road construction machinery. In September 1985 Technostroyexport and the Argentine state-owned organization Ferrocarriles Argentinos signed a contract on design and survey operations to electrify the railway Retiro-Pilar-Mercedes.

In 1985 a Soviet export goods show-room was opened in Buenos Aires. Apart from the permanent

display in which 20 all-Union foreign trade associations participate, the show-room puts on specialized exhibitions and is used for business meetings and showing advertising films. These activities give Argentina's business communities great opportunities to gain first-hand information on the USSR's export possibilities.

However, although Soviet export to Argentina expands, it is still several times less than the import of Argentine goods by the Soviet Union. Up till now the share of imports in trade turnover between our two countries amounts to more than 95 per cent.

For more than five years the Soviet Union has been buyer No. 1 of Argentine goods and its share in the total Argentine exports is 20 to 25 per cent. In 1984 the share of the USSR in the Argentine export of grain amounted to 29 per cent which includes the following breakdown: wheat 45 per cent, maize 34, sorghum 48, sunflower oil 56, linseed oil 37, and wool 15 per cent.

The ninth session of the Joint Soviet-Argentine Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation held in October 1985 in Moscow focused on the development of mutual trade, and first of all, Soviet exports. Both sides confirmed their intention to continue facilitating the development of business relations on a stable and long-term basis.

The Argentine side understood the concern expressed by the Soviet side in connection with the trade imbalance, and advised its intention to increase purchases in the USSR. The meeting's concluding protocol sets the annual volumes of minimum purchases by Argentina of machinery and equipment, including complete sets of equipment: in 1986 for 70 million dollars, in 1987 for 80 million dollars, in 1988 for 100 million dollars, in 1989 for 120 million dollars, and in 1990 for 130 million dollars (all in all for 500 million dollars).

While on this subject matter Soviet organizations expressed their interest in expanding deliveries to Argentina of oil drilling, handling and hoisting and power-generating equipment, trucks, tractors, road construction machinery, trolley-buses, anti-hail equipment; in the successful completion of negotiations on assembling cars, tractors and road construction machines; in the supply of trunk line electric locomotives, aviation technics, food, textile and pulp-and-paper equipment, ships, metallurgical equipment, including rolling mills and installations, etc.

The session also discussed Argentine exports to the USSR. It was noted that Argentine export of grain to the USSR was maintained at a high level and its volume considerably exceeded the minimum amounts provided for in the intergovernmental Grain Supply Agreement of July 10, 1980.

The Argentine delegation stated its interest in increasing the supplies to the USSR of its traditional goods: vegetable oils, soy-bean meal, wheat, and in the supplies of new types of goods, and first of all, finished manufactured products.

A new agreement for 1986-1990 providing for annual delivery from Argentina of four million tons of fodder grain and 500,000 tons of soy-beans was signed last January. Simultaneously exchange letters establishing annual minimal purchases of machines and equipment in the USSR were signed.

Much attention at the meeting was paid to economic, scientific and technical cooperation. The Soviet delegation expressed readiness to develop cooperation with Argentine organizations in the electrification of railways, in reconstructing the Bahía Blanca port, in developing a scheme for the comprehensive utilization of the Bermejo river basin, in the continuation of design work on the hydro-electric generating complex Paraná Medio, in the construction of oil-mills to process sunflower, cotton seeds and soy-beans, a plant to produce citric acid from sugar-cane molasses, in the construction of an irrigation complex, etc. The delegations also discussed possible cooperation in expanding Argentina's mining industry with payment in products from the future enterprises for the services of Soviet organizations. It was agreed that the Soviet and Argentine organizations would start elaborating ways of their cooperation on third countries' markets.

The delegations confirmed their interest in promoting cooperation in the fishing industry, and in particular, fishing in the Argentine waters with the participation of Soviet fish searching and catching vessels, in expanding technical servicing of Soviet ships between voyages in the Argentine shipyards and in other fields. The delegations also discussed implementation of the cooperation programme in science and technology.

The Soviet delegation spoke of its interest in holding a USSR National Exhibition in Buenos Aires in 1986. Such an exhibition will present to the broad public and

business communities in Argentina the Soviet Union's achievements in various fields of national economy and its possibilities as an active trading partner of Argentina.

Thus, the experience accumulated over many years shows that trade and economic cooperation between the USSR and Argentina has all prerequisites for onward development. For Argentina, trade with the Soviet Union to a certain extent stabilizes its economy. Let it be said that nearly half of its positive balance is ensured by the proceeds from trade with the Soviet Union. In addition, having an acute problem of marketing agricultural and food products Argentina is objectively interested in the Soviet Union's market. In its turn, for the USSR the Argentine market opens up substantial opportunities for the expansion of deliveries of machinery and equipment, in particular, power generating, oil drilling, mining, metallurgical, handling and hoisting, as well as railway transportation means, trucks and road construction machines, etc.

At the same time Soviet foreign trade associations in their sales of goods to Argentina come across a number of difficulties. The crisis state of economy of that country, sharpening of the foreign debt problem, lack of finance has caused the postponement for an indefinite period of a number of large construction projects and the modernization of industrial and energy projects in Argentina. This has protracted negotiations on the supply of equipment for a number of Argentine thermal and hydro-electric stations, on the delivery of trunk line electric locomotives, and the organization of Niva cars assembly, etc.

A lot of additional effort is required to increase the sales by Soviet associations of machinery and equipment to the Argentine private sector which is still little aware of the advantages of trade with the Soviet Union. Much remains to be done together with the Argentine buyers to establish continuous technical servicing of sold equipment and supply of spare parts for it.

The prospects of developing Soviet-Argentine trade and economic relations still further are connected first of all with the identification of new forms and methods

of cooperation. This primarily includes joint industrial production with Argentina's national firms, wider proliferation of counterpurchase export and import deals, combined activities on third countries' markets, consultant services, compensation-based cooperation, forming of joint-stock companies, etc.

There are obviously ample and largely untapped opportunities for the successful development of Soviet-Argentine trade and economic relations. Bilateral contacts both at the official and business levels, which have become more active recently, will enhance the development of mutually beneficial trade relations and consolidate the existing broad, all-round cooperation between the two countries.

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CHINA/FAR EAST/PACIFIC

CHINESE OFFICIAL REAFFIRMS 'CORRECTNESS' OF MARXISM-LENINISM

Peng Zhen Speech Cited

LD132018 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 13 Apr 86

[Text] The newspaper PEOPLE'S DAILY, the journal RED FLAG, and other press organs of the PRC have published the speech of Peng Zhen, member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, at Zhejiang University. In the speech, entitled "Improving Possession of the Weapon of Marxist Philosophy," it is noted that over a century of experience of social practice has proved the correctness of Marxist philosophy. The October Revolution became the first great test of Marxism, the experience of which showed its truth. After the October Revolution very many said that Soviet Russia would not exist for even a few days, but she did not only become continuously stronger and develop, but also endured cruel ordeals in WWII.

Out of WWII came one socialist state, a dictatorship of the proletariat--the Soviet Union--continued Peng Zhen. After the [word indistinct] democratic and socialist revolution in China, the country with the largest population. All of them gained victory under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism. These victories became further testimony to the correctness of Marxism and of the predictions of Marx. Peng Zhen said: It is "fallacious" to believe that the assimilation of Marxism-Leninism and the study of the foundations of Marxist-Leninist theory are a manifestation of conservatism and are directed against reforms. Marxism, he stressed, is a revolutionary doctrine; only communists who have a mastery of Marxism really correctly understand the need for the continuous change of society, continuous movement forward. If one must use the words "conservative," "moving into a cul-de-sac," then use it only about bourgeois theory and its apologists, said the chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

Mandarin Commentary

OW150847 Moscow in Mandarin to China 1600 GMT 14 Apr 86

[Text] RENMIN RIBAO, HONGQI, and other PRC newspapers and periodicals have published the speech delivered by Peng Zhen, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, at

Zhejiang University. The speech points out that practice over more than half a century shows the correctness of Marxist philosophy. The October Revolution was the first major test for Marxism. After the October Revolution, many people predicted that the Soviet Union would last only a few days. However, not only did it constantly develop and grow stronger but also stood a severe test during World War II.

Peng Zhen said: The first socialist country practicing proletarian dictatorship, the Soviet Union, emerged in the course of World War I. At that time, revolutions took place in Germany, Hungary, and many other countries. However, these revolutions ended up in failure. Following World War II, victories were achieved in revolutions in many countries, including the new democratic revolution and the socialist revolution in China, the most populous nation. The victories of all these revolutions were achieved under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism. These victories further demonstrated the correctness of Marxism and Marx's predictions.

Peng Zhen pointed out: Currently, some people in China are of the opinion that grasping Marxism-Leninism and studying the tenets of Marxism-Leninism mean conservatism and opposition to reforms. Such an argument is wrong. Can we carry out reforms or affirm the orientation of reform if we cut ourselves from Marxist-Leninist leadership? To study and solve the many problems arising from reforms, we must apply the tenets and methods of Marxism-Leninism.

Peng Zhen stressed: Marxism is revolutionary, not conservative; it is a developing theory, not a theory that has gone into a blind alley. However, if we replace Marxism-Leninism with a dogmatic attitude, do not integrate Marxism-Leninism with the actual situation, do not proceed from reality or display the spirit of seeking truth from facts in studying or solving problems but merely mechanically memorize theories and formulas, then we will certainly enter a blind alley on our own and lag behind developments.

The chairman of China's NPC Standing Committee pointed out that the founders of Marxism-Leninism opposed such an attitude from the beginning.

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CHINA/FAR EAST/PACIFIC

USSR-PRC: TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Moscow FOREIGN TRADE in English No 3, Mar 86 pp 8-11

[Article by Anatoli Kiryanov: "Trade and Economic Relations Between the Soviet Union and China Today"]

[Text]

The Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Trade and Payments in the 1986-1990 period went into force on January 1, 1986. This is the first long-term trade agreement throughout the history of Soviet-Chinese trade and economic relations. It is regarded by the Soviet and the Chinese sides as a great success achieved by joint efforts, as a basis for the further steady development of mutually beneficial trade relations between the two countries. In accordance with this agreement, this past January the parties signed in Peking a Protocol on Trade and Payments for 1986.

Trade and economic contacts between the USSR and China have always been the most stable form of bilateral interstate relations and served the interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples.

The legal basis of Soviet-Chinese trade and economic relations is provided by the Treaty of Trade and Navigation signed on April 23, 1958, between the governments of the USSR and People's Republic of China, which defines the basic principles of trade and navigation between the two countries. The Treaty envisages in particular that "... the parties shall take all the necessary measures for developing and strengthening the trade relations between the two countries in a spirit of friendly cooperation and mutual assistance, on the basis of equal rights and mutual benefit," and with this aim in view they will sign agreements, including the long-term ones, to develop trade in accordance with the requirements of the national economies of both states. Under the Treaty, "the sides shall grant

each other most-favoured-nation treatment in all questions concerning trade and navigation, as well as other forms of economic ties between the two states."¹

The other terms of mutual deliveries are defined in the General Terms of Deliveries from the USSR to China and from China to the USSR of April 10, 1957.

The trade and economic relations between the USSR and China over their 35-year history have undergone considerable changes. They may be divided into three distinct periods. The first period (till 1960) began immediately after the foundation of the People's Republic of China, when the young republic was faced with the difficult task of overcoming economic dislocation and rehabilitating and developing the economy. It was characterized by close friendship and all-round cooperation between the USSR and China. In that period the Soviet Union, guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and desirous of contributing to the building of socialism in China, gave it all-round assistance. In 1959 trade between the USSR and China reached its maximal level—1,849 million rubles.

The second period (1960-1970) was characterized by changes in the external and domestic economic policies of the Chinese leadership. In that period, Soviet-Chinese trade and economic relations were continually declining. The 1966-1970 period was one of a drastic curtailment of Soviet-Chinese trade and complete discontinuation of economic, scientific and technical cooperation. The year 1970 witnessed the lowest level of trade between the USSR and China: 42 million rubles, or 44-fold decrease against the figure for 1959. The Soviet share in Chinese foreign trade fell from 50 per cent in 1959 to 7.3 per cent in 1966 and 1.8 per cent in 1970.

The third period (1971-1980) was notable for an emergent tendency to stabilize trade between the two countries at a level of 200 to 300 million rubles with relatively balanced mutual shipments.

As can be seen from the above table, between 1976 and 1980 Soviet-Chinese trade, while being far below the maximal level of 1956-1960, nearly trebled the minimal level of 1966-1970. Nevertheless, the level of mutual trade achieved did not correspond to the possibilities and requirements of such big neighbouring countries as the Soviet Union and China.

Soviet-Chinese Trade*
1951-1980

	1951- -1955	1956- -1960	1961- -1965	1966- -1970	1971- -1975	1976- -1980	1976-1980 as a per- centage of 1956-1960	1976-1980 as a per- centage of 1966-1970
Trade turnover	5,112	7,214	2,822	562	967	1,551	21.5	276.0
Soviet export	2,915	3,315	1,003	303	472	807	24.3	266.3
Soviet import	2,197	3,898	1,819	259	495	744	19.1	287.3
* USSR Foreign Trade, Statistical Yearbooks for the corresponding years (in Russian).								

As a result of their mutual efforts and their mutual interest, the sides have reached an agreement on the need for a further expansion of trade between the USSR and China with a view to developing the economies of the two countries and improving the well-being of the Soviet and Chinese peoples. This agreement is actively being put into practice. In 1985 alone trade between the two countries rose by nearly 50 per cent as compared with 1984.

Soviet-Chinese Trade*
1981-1985

(mln rubles)

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1985 as compared to 1981
Trade turnover	175.8	223.5	488.2	977.8	1,605	9.1 times
Soviet export	82.6	120.1	255.6	467.9	779	9.4 times
Soviet import	94.2	103.4	232.6	509.9	826	8.8 times

* *USSR Foreign Trade*, Statistical Yearbooks for the corresponding years (in Russian).

In 1985 the Soviet Union shipped to China equipment and machinery, including civil aircraft, passenger cars and lorries, farm machinery, mining, power-generating and textile equipment, as well as various raw materials and chemical products, building materials and other types of industrial output: rolled ferrous metals and steel pipes, timber, cement, glass, fertilizers, etc.

Machines, equipment and transport facilities accounted for 31.3 per cent of the total volume of Soviet exports to China in 1985. These shipments included passenger cars and lorries, airplanes, helicopters, spare parts for motor vehicles and aircraft, and appreciable amounts of coal-mining, oil-drilling and textile equipment.

Besides the above the USSR also supplies pig iron, rolled ferrous metals, steel pipes, carbamide, cement, timber, sheet glass, refrigerators and other goods.

For its part, China exports to the USSR products of the mining industry, agriculture and live-stock breeding, as well as textile articles and other manufactures. The principal of these are: motor vehicle storage batteries, fluorite and its concentrate, ground talcum, colophony, cereals and oil-bearing crops, fruit, tea, common salt, cotton, raw silk, various fab-

rics, knitted goods, garments, fur and down articles, bed linen, towels, footwear and other consumer goods.

In 1982 the USSR and China reached an agreement on the resumption of frontier trade as a form of exchange enabling the parties to search for additional resources to expand their mutual trade. In 1983 such trade was resumed between the Soviet Far East and the Hellungkiang province and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in China. Its volume in 1983 amounted to 6.5 million rubles, in 1984—15.6 million rubles and in 1985—24.2 million rubles. It should be noted that in the 1960s the maximal volume of frontier trade between the USSR and China was only 5 million rubles a year. For the first time an agreement was reached on frontier trade between the Soviet Central Asian Republics and China's Sinkiang Uighur Region. For this purpose a specialized firm within the All-Union Association Vostokintorg has been established.

One of the positive factors promoting the expansion of Soviet-Chinese trade relations is the resumption, beginning in 1983, of shipments of Soviet and Chinese goods in the Sinkiang direction through the reception-delivery frontier points of Horgos and Turugart.

Late in 1984 I. V. Arkhipov, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, visited China for talks with Yao Yilin, Deputy Premier of the State Council, and other leaders of the People's Republic of China. During this visit three agreements were signed in Peking between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the People's Republic of China: on economic and technical cooperation, on scientific and technical cooperation, and on the setting up of a Soviet-Chinese Commission on Economic, Trade, Scientific and Technical Cooperation.²

In their statements on this occasion the Soviet and Chinese leaders pointed out that implementation of these agreements would promote economic development in both countries, the improvement of the well-being of their peoples and the creation of a favourable atmosphere for deepening mutual understanding and trust between the USSR and China.

During the talks in Peking the sides came to the conclusion that with an appreciable rise in the volume of their mutual trade the practice of signing similar agreements on trade and payments, that had existed until recently, was no longer up to the prospects of its further expansion. An agreement was reached on the signing in 1985 of appropriate documents on trade and economic cooperation on a long-term basis.

In July 1985, during Yao Yilin's official visit to the USSR, the two governments signed an Agreement on Trade and Payments for 1986-1990 and an Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation in Building and Modernizing Industrial Projects in China.

These arrangements provide for an annual expansion of shipments in the period ending in the year 1990 and indicate industrial and other projects in China to be built and modernized with Soviet participation.

The preamble to the Agreement on Trade and Payments for 1986-1990 states that the governments of the USSR and China have agreed to sign this Agreement, "noting the growth of trade between the two countries in recent years and with a view to providing conditions for its steady expansion on the principles of equal rights and mutual advantage, being guided by the desire for long-term trade relations between the two countries, and for the purpose of promoting the economic development of both countries."

As is stated in Article I of the Agreement, "both governments shall favourably study and take decisions on proposals which might be made by any one of them for achieving ever closer trade and economic relations between the two countries."

The Agreement indicates that mutual shipments between the USSR and China in 1986-1990 shall be effected in accordance with the commodity lists annexed to the Agreement as its inseparable part.

These lists may be specified in the range and quantity of goods, with due allowance for the requirements and possibilities of both countries and with the consent of their governments in signing annual protocols on trade and payments.

Soviet-Chinese Trade in 1986-1990
(as compared to the preceding five years)
(mln rubles)

	1981-1985*	1986-1990**	1981-1985 (as compared to 1986-1990)
Trade turnover	3,471.3	12,000	3.5 times
Soviet export	1,705.2	6,000	3.5 times
Soviet import	1,766.1	6,000	3.4 times

* *USSR Foreign Trade*, Statistical Yearbooks for the corresponding years (in Russian).

** *Pravda*, July 11, 1985.

The Agreement provides for an increase in the volume of mutual shipments of up to 12,000 million rubles in the current five-year period, while in the last year of the period these are to go up to 3,000 million rubles, i.e., the volume of trade planned for 1990 should double the figure for 1985.

In accordance with the Agreement, the relative weight of machines, equipment and transport facilities in Soviet exports to China over the five-year period should make up approximately 50 per cent on average. In this period the Soviet Union will ship to China 2,700 metal-cutting machine tools, 290 units of press-forging equipment, 10 sets of power units (200 MW each), 11 mechanized purification complexes, 7,500 railway cars, 100 electric locomotives, thousands of tractors, tens of thousands of lorries and passenger cars, airplanes, spare parts for motor vehicles and aircraft to the tune of 150 million rubles, 12 sets of poultry-raising equipment and other types of equipment.

Among Soviet raw materials to be shipped to China in the current five-year period the most important are: power-generating coal—2.8 million tons, oil products, pig iron—2.15 million tons, rolled ferrous metal, steel pipes and other articles for further processing—4 million tons, carbamide—2.5 million tons, cement—2.5 million tons, sheet glass—20 million square metres, timber—16 million cubic metres and other goods.

Over the 1986-1990 period China will export to the USSR products of the mining industry, agriculture and live-stock breeding, other raw materials, as well as a wide range of industrial consumer goods.

The most important of these goods are; 1,550,000 storage batteries for motor vehicles, products of the mining industry—1,250,000 tons, cereals and oil-bearing crops—10.3 million tons, meat and meat products (in terms of meat with bones)—748,000 tons, fruit—640,000 tons, tea—105,000 tons, table salt—500,000 tons, cotton—275,000 tons, various fabrics—1,500 million metres, knitwear, garments, fur, down articles and bed linen—to the amount of 460 million rubles, sports footwear—15 million pairs and other goods.

The Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation provides for the construction in China of 7 new projects and the modernization of 17 ones with Soviet assistance in such sectors as power engineering, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, mechanical engineering, the coal mining and chemical industries, transport and so on.³

The above long-term arrangements have created a good basis for the development of stable trade and economic relations between the USSR and the PRC. They will permit both countries to take into account their mutual commitments in working out their five-year state plans for 1986-1990.

Insofar as the documents referred to above do not exhaust the potentialities and requirements of the Soviet Union and China, the parties agreed not to regard the commodity contingents laid down in the agreements as restrictive and in signing annual protocols on trade and payments to provide for an increase in their mutual deliveries.

The two countries are not competitors on foreign markets: the range of goods exported by the USSR and China does not overlap. That is why broader trade is of mutual advantage to both parties, it is called upon to serve the interests of economic development in the USSR and China and of raising the well-being of their peoples. The two countries, however, will have certain difficulties in carrying out these agreements.

In the first place there is a transport problem. With the steep rise in mutual shipments already in 1985 and in the coming five years the goods turnover will increase at the same pace. That is why the outstanding problem of shipping foreign trade goods by all means of transport may become a serious obstacle to the execution of the agreements signed. The meeting on transportation questions held in Moscow in March 1985 and attended by representatives of the transport, foreign trade and planning organizations of the USSR and China set the transport workers of both countries extremely important tasks. The provision of transport services for goods in trade between the USSR and China in the coming five years will depend on how successfully they are accomplished.

The signing of the said long-term arrangements has evoked a broad response and approval in the Soviet and the Chinese press.

The CC CPSU Politbureau noted the important significance of these agreements. "The need has been confirmed for both countries on a mutually acceptable and equal basis to continue their efforts with a view to overcoming the negative barrier in Soviet-Chinese relations and restoring good-neighbourly co-operation."⁴

The newspaper *Jenmin Jihpao* in a report on the agreements wrote that "China and the Soviet Union have gone through years of mutual estrangement, and this arouses a feeling of regret. Over the past few years, thanks to both countries' efforts, Soviet-Chinese relations have witnessed positive changes. progress has been achieved above all in their trade and economic contacts. However, much is still to be done. The potential of economic cooperation between the two countries is to be increased still further."⁵

Possibilities for cooperation between the USSR and China are enormous. As M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, pointed out at the 27th CPSU Congress, "they are great because such cooperation is in line with the interests of both countries; because what is dearest to our peoples—socialism and peace—is indivisible."

¹ *Soviet-Chinese Relations*, A Collection of Documents, Moscow, 1959, pp. 396-397 (in Russian).

² See *Foreign Trade*, No. 8, 1985.

³ *Pravda*, July 11, 1985.

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 19, 1985.

⁵ *Jenmin Jihpao*, July 11, 1985; *Pravda*, July 16, 1985.

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CHINA/FAR EAST/PACIFIC

SOVIET FAR EAST TRADE WITH PACIFIC REGION

Moscow FOREIGN TRADE in English No 3, Mar 86 pp 29-34

[Article by Valeri Chichkanov, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute of Economic Research, the Far Eastern Scientific Centre of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "The Soviet Far East in the USSR's Trade with the Pacific Region"]

[Text]

Much attention is accorded in the Soviet Union to the development of its eastern areas. "Accelerated development of the productive forces in Siberia and the Far East remains a component part of the Party's economic strategy."¹ The abundance of diverse natural resources in this most eastern part of the USSR can make it advantageous to set up a large economic base there. This process, however, is hindered by the insufficient level of development of its territory, the tight balance of manpower resources, harsh climate and the region's remoteness from the main producing and consuming regions of the USSR.

The economic development of Soviet Far East can be accelerated, for instance, by its broader participation in the USSR's economic ties with the countries of the Pacific basin. Its proximity to the socialist states of Asia and the industrial capitalist countries and the developing nations in this area of the world, the availability in our Far East of many types of resources and finished products of interest to these countries and the availability in these countries of goods needed by Soviet Far East economic area give good possibilities for increasing this area's contribution to the USSR's economic relations with the Pacific states.

The export orientation of production helps its centralization, the integrated use of natural resources and the intensified economic development of new territories. A quarter-century ago V.S. Nemchinov, an outstanding

Soviet economist, wrote that the mineral and biological resources of the Soviet Far East "may be used to an economic maximum only provided the trans-Baikal Far Eastern economy is oriented on export."²

Imports from the countries of the Pacific basin, in turn, make it possible to effectively solve a whole number of regional development problems. First, there is an opportunity to markedly reduce or even discontinue altogether the delivery of similar products from the country's areas far away from the Far East, thus cutting down on transportation costs. Second, imports from these countries can cover the needs of the Soviet Far Eastern population for goods which owing to the natural conditions in the USSR are either not produced at all or produced only in insufficient quantities, for instance, tropical fruits and vegetables. Third, and this is perhaps most important, due to imports Soviet Far East has a good chance of building up its economic might.

Today products from the Far Eastern economic area account for about 20 per cent of the USSR's trade with the countries in the Pacific region. The area is notable for a relatively high level of export specialization, expressed by its greater share in the Union's exports as compared with its share in the country's gross industrial output. Between 1970 and 1983 the volume of export deliveries rose there by 70 per cent. On particular items, Far Eastern exports play a great role in the country's total exports: over 40 per cent of round timber, 8 per cent of pulp, 4 per cent of sawn timber, 33 per cent of fish, over 50 per cent of canned fish, 20 per cent of ship winches, over 8 per cent of grain harvester combines. Far Eastern products are notable on the export lists of many all-Union foreign trade associations.

The list of goods exported by the Far East contains nearly a hundred items. Practically all sectors of the region's economy participate in export production, some of these sectors having a clear-cut export orientation. These include the lumbering, woodworking, pulp-and-paper, fishing and chemical industries. Nearly 300 enterprises in all territories and regions of the Soviet Far East place their products on the foreign market. The leading role among these belongs to enterprises in the Primorski and Khabarovski Territories, and they account for over 80 per cent of the area's exports. The Khabarovski Territory exports the bulk of products turned out by its engineering industry and timber complex, while the Primorski Territory exports a considerable portion of its fish and sea products,

chemicals, coal and ores. At the same time, two industries—lumbering and fishing, contribute 83.5 per cent of its total exports.

The principal tendencies of the commodity markets in the Pacific basin as well as the development plans on the Soviet Far East itself call for a further formation of the region's export base along two lines: increasing exports of raw materials and semi-finished products which are much in demand on the foreign market, and diversifying production so as to tangibly increase the proportion of finished product exports. In all cases it is absolutely necessary to sharply raise the quality of export products so that the goods turned out by the Far Eastern enterprises obtain and retain a high degree of competitiveness in international trade.

Soviet Far East products go to nearly 50 countries, but their major purchaser is *Japan*. Most of the pulp, paper, sawn timber and fish products go to that country.

At the same time an appreciable portion of equipment, machines and steel pipes which Japan exports to the USSR is for Soviet Far Eastern industries developing natural resources in the region. Complete sets of plant are a valuable element in Soviet-Japanese economic ties. In the region's southern zone alone they have been used to fit out 21 enterprises chiefly in the food and building industries. Among the local population there is a great demand for Japanese consumer goods.

The USSR's business contacts with Japan are interesting in the sense that they have widely assumed such promising forms of cooperation as compensation agreements and coastal trade. The general compensation agreements, as a rule, provide for the delivery of Japanese machines, equipment and materials on credit, while the Soviet side will supply Japan on a long-term basis with part of the output produced on the given equipment.

Compensation agreements help step up the development of the country's eastern areas, organize large economic complexes and expand the base supplying our internal needs and manufacturing goods fulfilling a world market demand. The sufficiently long experience of our trade and economic relations with Japan shows the interest she exhibits in obtaining the natural resources she lacks from the Soviet Far East. It is not

mere chance therefore that the joint projects with Japan mainly assist the intensive development of the extractive industries, while the credits received for these projects are repaid by Soviet shipments to Japan of round timber, sawn timber and coal. Let us touch on some of these projects.

In April 1974, for the first time in the history of Soviet-Japanese economic relations, an intergovernmental protocol was signed on granting the Soviet Union a \$1,050 million credit. To implement the agreement on the development of the South Yakutian coal-fields the Japanese side gave the USSR a \$450 million credit.

Using this credit, Soviet organizations have purchased motor transport facilities, hoisting gear, earth-moving machines and other equipment and materials required for a coal-mining complex, a dressing plant and building a railway to the station of Berkakit ("Little BAM"). Fifty-seven Japanese firms participated in the shipment of plant and machinery. In accordance with the agreement, the Soviet side has undertaken to ship within the coming 20 years 104 million tons of coking coal to Japan. Annual shipments began in 1985 and in the course of time will reach 5.5 million tons a year. The development of the South-Yakutian coal-fields on this credit basis opens up favourable prospects for the broad commercial export of coal as well.

In August 1985, in the town of Neryungri, the centre of the coal-mining complex, the parties held a ceremony celebrating the delivery to Japan of the first million tons of high-quality Yakutian coal. At the meeting held on this occasion K. Tanaka, President of the Nippon Steel Corporation, pointed out that the implementation of the project was of epoch-making significance, determined not only by the size of the project but also by its contribution to friendly relations between the USSR and Japan.

Another compensation project has been formalized by a series of agreements on the development of timber resources in the Soviet Far East. Under the third of these agreements signed in 1981, the Soviet Union will in the 1981-1986 period ship to Japan 12 million cubic metres of commercial timber. For her part, Japan has undertaken to deliver, along with timber-carriers and construction machines, a complete plant to manufacture wood-particle boards.

The first stage of the construction of Vostochny port can well be taken as a positive example of compensation-based cooperation. This project has made it possible to undertake transshipments of international containers to European countries (and back) through Soviet territory (the Trans-Siberian Container Line—TSCL). Between 1971 and 1982 the number of containers shipped rose from 2,000 to 153,000 (in terms of 20-foot containers). With the building of the BAM railway and the second stage of the port, the capacity of the TSCL, specialists say, will more than double.

This type of cooperation enables the Soviet Union to increase the capacity of its Far Eastern “sea gate,” while Japan benefits from the shortened delivery time and reduced transportation cost of the “Siberian bridge” route as compared with sea shipments.

Special mention should be made of our compensation agreement with Japan on cooperation in the exploration and equipment of oil- and gas-fields on the Sakhalin shelf and their development. This arrangement and the 1979 supplement to the general agreement provide that the prospecting for and extraction of oil and gas be effected by Soviet organizations with the invitation, in individual cases, of Japanese specialists. As for the Japanese side, the *ad hoc* joint-stock company Sakhalin Sekiyu Kaihatsu Kyoryoku Kabushiki Kaisha is participating in the Sakhalin project. This company has allowed Soviet organizations, from an over \$150 million granted credit, to use on lease terms floating installations and drilling equipment, equipment for geological prospecting, and also consumer goods. The credit and interest on it will be repaid by oil and gas shipments from Sakhalin shelf. After the repayment of credits the Japanese side may, during a period of ten years, purchase at world prices up to half the volume of oil and gas annually extracted from the jointly discovered deposits.

At present the conditions for expanding cooperation between the Soviet Union and the USA are being poorly utilized. The contacts are irregular and unstable, the structure of trade is constantly changing. The US discriminatory restrictions with respect to the USSR have weakened the economic ties between the two countries, including those between them in the Pacific region.

There are, however, some contacts of mutual advantage to Soviet and American partners. The US firm Robbins, in particular, shipped tunnelling equipment

to the USSR that was used to bore tunnels for the BAM railway. Miners in Magadan region are using machinery supplied by International Harvester and Caterpillar. McDermott, which designs and manufactures equipment for oil extraction on a shelf with heavy ice conditions, is participating in the Sakhalin Project. Pepsico has to build a plant in Vladivostok to produce its drink. For over ten years now, Soviet and American fishermen have been jointly working within the framework of the joint-stock company Marine Resources, where 50 per cent of the shares belong to the Soviet Sovrybflot and the other half to the American Bellingham Cold Storage with a seat in Seattle. The company organizes joint fishing in the sea zones of the USA and Canada, processes catches and sells the output on world markets.

The recent joint monograph, *Soviet-American Horizons on the Pacific*, planned for parallel publication by Progress Publishers (Moscow) and the University of Hawaii Press is devoted to finding new possibilities for expanding these relations. Among the Soviet contributors to this monograph, edited jointly by Professor J. Stephan of University of Hawaii and the author of this article, are leading researchers at the Institute of Economic Research of the Far Eastern Scientific Centre of the USSR Academy of Sciences Ye.B. Kovrigin, P.A. Minakir, V.G. Smolyak, N.L. Shlyk and a number of Moscow scientists. The American side is represented by scientists from the Hawaiian Islands, California and the State of Washington. In the monograph the Soviet and American scientists, while drawing on the positive experience of the past and the mutual complementarity of the two countries' economic structures, consider, each from their own viewpoint, the prospects of trade, economic, scientific and technical ties between these great powers in the Pacific region and the entire world. We are prepared to think about writing similar works in cooperation with scientists in Japan, China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other countries.

In the long term, too, the economic cooperation between the USSR and the industrial capitalist countries in the Pacific region will perhaps be developing on a compensation basis. What is more, this cooperation may concern not only large, but also small and medium projects, thus making compensation-based cooperation much more applicable and general.

Coastal and frontier trade is a traditional form of the Soviet Far East's participation in the USSR's external economic ties. Coastal trade between the prefectures on Japan's western coast and the Soviet Far East and Siberia has been going on for over 20 years. Frontier trade is also progressing.

The specificity of coastal and frontier trade is that the export pattern is founded on local products. In some cases these are industrial raw materials, in others—sea products as a traditional food for local populations. We import consumer and industrial goods as needed by our Far East. Economic executives and local population see prototypes and specimens of these products at coastal trade exhibitions held regularly in Khabarovsk, Nakhodka and Irkutsk.

Another characteristic of this trade is the commodity exchange principle of keeping these export-import operations balanced: the proceeds from our Far Eastern exports are used to purchase goods that Soviet Far East needs.

The third feature of this form of trade consists in the contingent of participants. The Soviet side is represented by Far Eastern economic organizations operating on the foreign market through the All-Union Foreign Trade Association Dalintorg, specially set up. Japan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and recently China, participate in this trade basically through numerous small and medium enterprises, trading companies, firms and cooperatives.

Soviet Far Eastern coastal trade has also extended to Australia. At the Soviet-American symposium held in Khabarovsk (USSR) in the summer of 1985 both sides supported a proposal to study the possibility of extending coastal trade to the trade and economic relations between the Soviet Far East and the US Far West.

In the recent period the southern areas of the Soviet Far East have resumed frontier trade with the northern provinces of China. We are pleased by the fact that more and more Chinese goods can be seen in the stores of Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, while goods from the Soviet Far East are on sale in the towns and villages of Heilungkiang province and the autonomous area of Inner Mongolia.

In 1984 the volume of coastal and frontier trade topped 95 million rubles. The results of its development attest to the growing importance of this exchange in the

economic development of the USSR's Far Eastern areas. This trade brings into play raw material resources which in the past our Far Eastern industry either did not use at all or used irrationally (non-industrial wood, timber-sawing and woodworking wastes, some sea products and mineral raw materials). The closeness of the market increases the profitability of export shipments thanks to the reduced transportation costs.

We place on the Japanese market goods like forest products, fish, sea products, mineral raw materials, power-generating coals, some foodstuffs.

To the Democratic People's Republic of Korea we export kerosene, aluminium utensils, glass, household soap. Recently the range of our exports to that country has expanded due to the sale of refrigerators, TV sets, detergents. Their growing sales have led to an appreciable expansion of the frontier trade with the DPRK, and it has more than doubled compared with 1979.

There are broad possibilities for trade with the socialist countries in Asia because of their geographical proximity to the USSR, the community of the tasks of raising the effectiveness of social production and the availability of natural resources of mutual interest.

The Soviet Far East exports its goods to *Vietnam* in ever larger quantities, including, above all, cement, timber (industrial wood and sawn timber), canned fish, machines. From Vietnam the Soviet Far East receives fresh vegetables and fruits, bananas, water-melons, pineapples, tea, ground-nuts and so on. These goods are commonly carried by vessels of the Far Eastern Shipping Company. Teams of Soviet Far Eastern dockers were sent to Vietnam to help unload ships and to train Vietnamese dockers in the methods of organizing loading and unloading operations and using port equipment. This has trebled the labour productivity of Vietnamese dockers.

An analysis of the Soviet Far East's participation in the USSR's cooperation with Vietnam shows that it is highly diversified and of mutual advantage. However, the dimensions and forms of this cooperation do not by far fully correspond to the possibilities and economic interests of the two countries. At the meetings of the heads of government of both countries emphasis was laid on the need to expand trade and economic cooperation between the Soviet Far East and Vietnam.

There are numerous economic prerequisites already existing for this purpose.

First, the Soviet Far East has considerable natural resources and great industrial potential. In view of this and also because of the sectoral specialization of the region's economic complex, it is profitable to increase the output there of some products exported to Vietnam and reduce the relative weight of shipments from other areas of the Soviet Union. Second, the initial period of industrialization in Vietnam and the pioneer character of the development of many areas in the Soviet Far East and their similar possessions of mineral resources predetermine the development of identical features in the structure of production complexes and the common requirements for machinery and several industrial goods (rolled ferrous metals, oil products, mineral fertilizers, etc.), thus creating conditions for the transition to both inter- and intra-sectoral specialization. Third, broader trade contacts with Vietnam may help solve successfully the important problem of regularly supplying our Far East with cheaper fresh fruits and vegetables as compared with their delivery from the western areas of the USSR (over 250,000 tons of these products are delivered from the latter areas annually).

For its part, Vietnam is taking vigorous measures to develop its agriculture and light industry and on this basis increase the export of many goods needed by the Soviet Far East. The decisions of the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam set out the guidelines for further building up the country's economic potential and its sectoral export specialization.

In view of the foregoing, it is possible to forecast the main directions for the further expansion and improvement of the Soviet Far East's participation in the USSR's trade and economic ties with Vietnam. The most promising of these are: greater farm produce shipments from Vietnam to the Soviet Far East on the basis of international specialization; production cooperation in particular industries (mechanical engineering, timber-processing); distribution of labour-intensive lines of production where they best suit the rational utilization of raw material and manpower resources; development of the coastal trade between the Soviet Far East and individual provinces of Vietnam.

These tasks call for an integrated study and stage-by-stage solution with due allowance for the possibili-

ties of both parties. This work is now in progress, and illustrated, particularly, by two Soviet-Vietnamese symposia: the first was held in Khabarovsk in 1980, and the second in Ho Chi Minh in 1982, at which the parties had a detailed discussion on these questions and proposed concrete measures to enhance the participation of the Soviet Far East in the trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation of the two countries.

The participation of Soviet Far Eastern enterprises in the USSR's trade and economic contacts with *Mongolia* has also become a tradition. Characteristic in this respect is the stable growth of export shipments with progressive changes in their pattern: there is a rise in the proportion of plant and machinery, light and food industry products, ferrous metals and chemical products. These exports to Mongolia account for more than half of the total volume of shipments from the Soviet Far East to the socialist countries in Asia. The Khabarovsk Territory's enterprises are most active in this respect. They export to Mongolia garments, confectionery, machines and equipment, sulphuric acid, oil products, medicaments, building materials and consumer goods. All these goods are well known in Mongolia and there is a stable demand for them.

Soviet-Mongolian economic cooperation is growing in all directions and reaching an ever higher level of development. At their present stage these relations are characterized by the elaboration and coordination of national economic development plans, establishment of Mongolian-Soviet enterprises, and formation of direct contacts between ministries and departments, production and scientific organizations.

All these measures are enhancing the development of Mongolia's economy, widening the range and improving the export pattern which is now showing a tangible increase in the relative weight of finished products and semi-manufactures (sheepskin articles, carpets, tin concentrate and so on).

It should be noted that geographically and economically Mongolia is gravitating towards the eastern areas of the USSR. This is producing a favourable effect on the development and deepening of the local integration processes in power engineering, the light and food industries, non-ferrous metallurgy and the frontier cooperation as a whole.

The participation of Soviet Far Eastern industry in the development of Soviet-Mongolian economic relations will be furthered in the main by increasing the volume of shipments and widening their range within the framework of traditional trade between the two countries and also for the Soviet-assisted enterprises in Mongolia. In addition, now is the time to organize production cooperation with Mongolian enterprises, above all with those in the light industry, for instance, those manufacturing clothing, knitted wares and leather haberdashery. This would provide additional means for expanding mutual economic contacts through integration.

Soviet Far Eastern enterprises are active in broadening economic cooperation between the USSR and the *Democratic People's Republic of Korea*. Here many forms of cooperation have come into being, involving various industries and transport. In the long term, we believe, it would be important to widen and deepen the existing industrial cooperation in ferrous metallurgy and individual sectors of mechanical engineering (such as machine-tool construction), the fishing industry (development of sea-culture economies), rice growing, salt-processing.

There are real possibilities for the Soviet Far East's broader participation in the USSR's cooperation with *China*, and not only by increasing shipments of its traditional goods, but also by organizing other forms of cooperation such as operations on the basis of the customer's raw materials, compensation transactions and so on.

Fulfilment of the above-mentioned tasks can assure deeper cooperation between Soviet Far Eastern areas and the socialist countries in Asia and it will, in our opinion, open up real prospects for broader cooperation with Laos and Kampuchea and enhance the process of socialist economic integration on the Asian continent.

This cooperation is taking place in several areas where under agreement workers from the socialist countries of Asia are employed in the USSR. In accordance with the agreement between the USSR and the DPRK, in Khabarovsk Territory (since 1967) and Amur Region (since 1975) Korean workers have been engaged in timber felling and technological chip pro-

duction with Soviet equipment. This mutually advantageous form of cooperation is constantly improving and steadily developing. We believe, there are ample opportunities for cooperation in employing Vietnam's manpower resources as well. The production of furniture in the Soviet Far East may serve as the initial subject of such cooperation.

Today, in accordance with the 1981 Soviet-Vietnamese intergovernmental agreement, young Vietnamese workers are being trained in various trades and professions and working in the Soviet Union, including its eastern areas.

The other form of cooperation (which does not preclude the first one) in mitigating the manpower deficit in the Soviet Far East is the transfer of enterprises manufacturing individual parts, units or initial materials (including enterprises processing Soviet Far Eastern raw materials) to the socialist countries in Asia. This is in effect a way of developing production cooperation and quite possible in the clothing, textile and tanning industries. In our opinion, cooperation in the field of manpower resources, which is assuming ever larger dimensions in the world socialist economy, should also find its way to the Soviet Far Eastern economic area.

In conclusion, we would like to mention once again the fundamental problems facing the Soviet Far East in the sphere of economic activity under review which are: searches for new forms of mutually advantageous economic contacts with our Pacific partners with the beneficial use of the international division of labour; raising the quality of export products and their international competitiveness; assuring a reasonable approach to the import of wares purchased with foreign currency; proper employment of imported machinery. Successful solution of these problems will strengthen the international positions of the Soviet Union in the Pacific region and further its integration processes with the socialist countries in Asia.

¹ *The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, (New edition).

² V.S. Nemchinov, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1967, Vol. 4, p. 47 (in Russian).

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MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA/SOUTH ASIA

60-YEAR HISTORY OF INDIAN COMMUNIST PARTY RECALLED

Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS in Russian No 12, Dec 85 pp 108-112

[Article by F.V. Nilov in the column "People, Events, Facts": "The Communist Party of India--60 Years"]

[Excerpts] The Communist Party of India (CPI) was established in December 1925 by a group of revolutionaries and patriots who had turned to Marxism-Leninism in the period of upsurge of the massive antiimperialist national-liberation struggle of the Indian people, headed by the Indian National Congress (INC) under the leadership of M.K. Gandhi. At this time, the Indian proletariat, which had emerged as a result of the development of factory-plant industry and transport belonging chiefly to foreign capital. The national liberation movement and the struggle of the Indian proletariat became the foundation on which was the Communist Party of India was established, strengthened and developed. The development of the mass national liberation movement and the struggle of the Indian working class took place under the tremendous impact of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

As was emphasized in a document of the Central Executive Committee of the National Council of the CPI "The Communist Party of India. Fifty Years of Struggle and Progress. 1925-1975," "the CPI was born from a fusion of militant antiimperialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism, the struggle for national freedom and the class struggle for socialism."

The Communist Party of India played a notable role in the national liberation struggle of the Indian people against British domination. It was one of the most active forces of the national liberation movement. To it belongs the leading role in dissemination of the ideas of scientific socialism in India. It was the first to attempt to apply them to Indian conditions. These ideas found support among many revolutionary democrats and fighters for national independence, including prominent figures of the Indian National Congress among whom the figure of Jawaharlal Nehru became eminent.

The CPI conducted a systematic policy of strengthening the unity of leftist and democratic forces in the struggle against British imperialism. Its cooperation with the INC was particularly important in these years--both with the leadership of this party and with rank-and-file members working directly among the masses. This in particular was expressed in the fact that many

leaders of the CPI were elected members of the All-India Committee of the Congress--the leading organ of the INC.

The active participation of communists in the national liberation struggle brought in its wake severe persecution and repression on the part of British colonizers who tried to isolate the communist movement from the mainstream of the national-liberation struggle. A series of court trials of communists was conducted to this end, accusing them of plots for the purpose of overthrowing the power of the English crown. The trials in Peshawar (1922), Kanpur (1924) and in Mirut (1929-1931) were aimed at eliminating the leaders of the communist and the workers movement as a whole in the country and nipping it in the bud. In the course of the first 27 years of its existence (1925-1942), the Communist Party of India was forced to operate under the conditions of the underground and constant persecutions by the British authorities.

In the period preceding India's attainment of independence, the Communist Party of India markedly increased its influence among the working class. This promoted its cooperation with democratic forces, especially in the National Congress. As pointed out by the CPI's leadership, the Communist Party of India in this period "assumed with respect to the INC a position of joint struggle against imperialism in combination with criticism and struggle against the class narrow mindedness of the dominating group of the National Congress's leadership, which was working for compromise with the enemy, acted as a brake on the mass revolutionary struggle and was incapable of fully achieving the necessary national unity. Cooperating with the National Congress on the basis of Leninist policy of unity in the struggle and fighting at the same time against rightist reformism and "leftist" sectarianism, the CPI strengthened its independent political base, especially among the workers and the laboring peasantry."²

After India had achieved political independence, the CPI's leadership was not able at first to orient itself correctly in the new existing situation. At the 2nd CPI Congress held in February-March 1938 and after it, it allowed a number of leftist sectarian mistakes which did a great deal of damage to the party, weakening the positions of the communists and for a certain amount of time made it difficult for their cooperation with other democratic forces.

Just at the 5th CPI Congress (1956), a conclusion was reached to the effect that the Indian national bourgeoisie (with the exception of representatives of large and monopolist capitalists) could play a certain progressive role in the solution of the social and economic problems of independent India. On this basis, the communists adopted a policy of unity of action with all of the country's progressive national and patriotic progressive forces. This contributed to expansion of the CPI's influence among the masses. At the 1957 general elections, the Communist Party mustered 10.8 million votes (8.9 percent) and became the main opposition party in the center and in the states of Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal.³ Furthermore, as a result of these elections, the CPI gained a majority of deputy mandates in the legislative assembly of Kerala and with the support of several independent deputies formed its own government.

In subsequent years, a thoroughly thought-out, mature assessment by the communists of the position in the country, the arrangement and correlation of class and political forces bore substantial fruit. The Communist Party of India increased its influence among the masses, and its numbers grew, amounting to 300,000 persons by the end of the '50s. But by this time, differences within the CPI became exacerbated on a number of important questions. The chief of them was the question of the relation of communists to the Indian national bourgeoisie and the ruling party the Indian National Congress. These differences led to the breakup of the CPI into two parties--the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India/Marxist--the CPI/M. Subsequently the CPI/M underwent still another split--there emerged from it rather numerous groups of leftist extremists who were not agreed in regard to the broad use by the party of parliamentary methods of struggle at the end of the '60s.

The split in the Communist movement and the antagonism between the CPI and the CPI/M resulted in the fact that for a long time both parties in essence were unable to head the democratic movement of workers. This took place at the time when the broad popular masses were in particular need of leadership from the direction of leftist parties. It is namely in the middle of the '60s that the movement of workers for their rights became active. This was brought on by a deterioration in their position resulting from economic stagnation and growth of high prices and inflation.

In the middle of the '70s, the political struggle in India became markedly intensified. This was related to exacerbation of economic difficulties, growth of unemployment, rising prices, especially for consumer goods and the like. Attempts of the INC government to implement certain progressive measures in the interests of the broad strata of the population were blocked by the large landowners and wholesalers as well as the monopolist circles of the bourgeoisie.

Bourgeois opposition parties decided to use the developed difficulties for the purpose of increasing their influence. They succeeded in launching a mass movement whose leaders proclaimed as their aim carrying out of a so-called "total revolution" and called for the formation of a unified bourgeois opposition to the ruling INC both in the localities as well as at the center. They came out with a demand for the dismissal of Prime Minister I. Gandhi, accusing her of violating the rules of conducting an election campaign in 1972. However, they did not succeed in this.

In June 1975, a state of emergency was introduced, on the basis of which many leaders of opposition parties were arrested and activities of a number of religious-community and leftist extremist groups were forbidden. At the same time, the government of I. Gandhi proclaimed a program of progressive social and economic measures (the 20-Point Program) aimed at improving the situation of workers, especially of the city and country poor.⁴

Assessing the activities of the Communist Party as a whole during the period of the state of emergency (1975-1977), the 11th CPI Congress reached the conclusion that "support of the state of emergency was a mistake from the very

beginning" as it failed to "protect the interests of the people or to promote the organization of mass resistance to reaction."⁵

On coming to power as a result of 1977 parliamentary elections, the government of Janat's coalition bloc was unable to solve the complex social problems facing the country. According to the CPI's assessment, the activities of this government showed that its economic policy "did not contribute in any way to the solution of national problems or protection of the national interests of the country from the new neocolonialist offensive of imperialism, that it was only aggravating the crisis process and weakening the struggle to strengthen economic independence...." On the basis of its analysis of the situation in the country, the Communist Party of India declared that the "crisis of the capitalist way of development and bourgeois class politics had deepened to such an extent that not a single bourgeois party was in a position to bring the country out of this crisis or to save the people from the threat of authoritarianism and violation of democratic rights."⁶

In this connection the CPI introduced the slogan of creating a leftist and democratic alternative to the bourgeois rule and declared its "central political task in the forthcoming period to be a struggle for the realization of this perspective." It was emphasized at the same time that in view "of the complexity and instability" of the existing situation "the solution of the problem of creating a leftist and democratic national alternative would be a difficult and long process of unification of mass struggle, mass movements and political struggle."⁷

The Communist Party also pointed out that in the developed political situation, the problem of uniting the country's leftist forces and in particular the organization of united mass demonstrations and establishment of closer relations between the CPI and the CPI(M). It also was pointed out that "neither the unity of the CPI and the CPI(M) nor the unity of all the leftist parties will in itself make it possible to solve all the problems, taking into account the extraordinary complexity of the existing situation. Unified efforts of all leftist and democratic parties are required."⁸

At the next, 12th congress (1982), the Communist Party of India again pointed out the special importance of unity of all leftist forces, especially the CPI and the CPI(M) for the creation of a democratic alternative to bourgeois rule in the country, which in its opinion was a "strategic task" and could be accomplished in the course of a "long and complex process of difficult political, ideological and mass struggle."⁹ The party pointed to concrete questions for which "cooperation between our party and other leftist parties and certain bourgeois parties, including the INC(I) was possible and necessary." Among them were such key problems as questions of war and peace, foreign policy, the struggle against imperialism, protection of national sovereignty and integrity of the country, the secular character of the state, the struggle against separatist forces, religious-community dissension and so on.¹⁰

In recent years, the intrapolitical situation in India has become markedly more difficult. Following the tragic death of I. Gandhi in October 1984, which was preceded by an intensive campaign of separatist, schismatic and

terrorist forces in Punjab, supported from without and aimed at splitting the country. the ruling party of the INC(I), systematically and determinedly promoting the slogan of unity, sustained a major defeat in the parliamentary elections in December 1984. Offering its assessment of these elections, the National Council of the Communist Party of India noted that the new government headed by Rajiv Gandhi awakened the hopes of the broad strata of the population. The government secured the people's mandate for solution of the problems of Punjab and Assam and for improving the living conditions of India's workers.

The Communist Party of India declared that it would support all positive measures of the government in the interest of the country's unity, integrity, and defense of peace throughout the whole world and in the interest of the people. At the same time, the CPI leadership noted that the Communist Party would play the role of leftist opposition and planned to promote a concrete "alternative" to the social and economic program, which responded to the hopes of the people. For the purpose of working out such a program, it would work for cooperation with other leftist parties, especially with the CPI/M.¹¹

India's communist movement is developing under extremely complex and contradictory conditions, characterized by the opposition of various class and political forces, including religious-caste, regional and separatist ones. The correct solution in this complex situation, taking into account class interest, is far from a simple task, which will have to be solved by Indian communists. Their guiding star in this matter is constant adherence to the struggle for the rights and interests of Indian workers, for the development of India along the path of social progress and democracy and for the unity and integrity of the country and against the forces of reaction and separatism. Indian communists are determinedly coming out for implementation by India of an antiimperialist, antineocolonialist and peace-loving policy and for friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Throughout the years of independence, India's communist movement has become a marked force in the country's political arena which all the rest of the parties have to take into account. Aiming in recent years for a rapprochement between the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India/Marxist on many important questions of political and mass struggle, first of all in the interest of workers, it contributes to strengthening the positions of all leftist and democratic forces of the country.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Communist Party of India. Fifty Years of Struggle and Advance. 1925-1975." (Central Executive Committee of the National Council of the CPI). New Delhi, 1975, p 5.
2. Ibidem, p 10.
3. Election Commission of India. "Report of the Fourth General Election to the House of the People in India, 1967," pp 64-65.

4. See Reginin, A.I., "Indiyskiy natsionalnyy kongress. Ocherki ideologii i politiki" [The Indian National Congress. Descriptions of Ideology and Politics]. Moscow, 1978, pp 203-205.
5. "XI syezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Indii. Bkhatinda, 31 marta-7 aprelya 1978 g." [11th Congress of the Communist Party of India. Bhatinda, 31 March-7 April 1978]. Moscow, 1979, pp 22, 23.
6. Ibidem, pp 144, 156.
7. Ibidem, pp 156, 163.
8. See ibidem, pp 157, 161.
9. "Documents of the 12th Congress of the Communist Party of India. Varanasi, 22 to 28 March 1982," pp 58, 62, 65.
10. Ibidem, p 63.
11. NEW AGE, 27 Jan 1985.

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MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA/SOUTH ASIA

WORK OF SOVIET-AFGHAN TRANSPORT SOCIETY DETAILED

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Feb 85 p 4

[Article by V. Okulov, PRAVDA special correspondent: "The Trucks Are Moving on the Roads--Afghan Report"]

[Text] Kabul, February-- Sixty-five years ago the first Soviet-Afghan treaty was signed, laying the basis for friendly relations between the two peoples. One aspect of our cooperation is described in this article.

At the board of the Afghan-Soviet Joint Stock Transport-Dispatching Company (AFSOTR), located in the center of Kabul, the sound of teletype machines resounds the whole day long. I see telegrams received on the telex on the table of S. Garin, the chief of the transit department. Requests, information on movement of freight received from the Japanese firms of Gyro, Yamashita and Nissan and from the Czechoslovak firm Progoinvest. Here are telegrams from Hamburg--the Transglobus Company. A request from Sofia, reports from Singapore, Hong Kong, India--more than 120 of the largest transport companies cooperate with AFSOTR.

The president of the company is the young and energetic Dzhomadin Zazan, who has held almost all positions up the ladder in the company, while the vice president, an employee of one of the company's Soviet partners, Soyuzvneshtans, is Ivan Fedorovich Prokofyev. They describe the history of the enterprise. It was founded 10 years ago for the purpose of handling transport operations engendered by the growth in Afghan-Soviet relations, first of all, the trade between Afghanistan and the USSR, and transit shipments across the territory of our country as well. Fifty-one percent of the stock belongs to the Afghan side, the rest to Soviet shareholders.

Is the company operating successfully? Judge for yourself. Shareholder capital increased more than tenfold during this time. AFSOTR has the largest motor enterprise in the capital with offices in several cities and departments with production depots at the border river ports of Hairaton and Sherhan and in Turgundi. More than half of the freight going through these gates of commerce into Afghanistan and through it is shipped by the joint stock company. Its share is growing from year to year in the total volume of the republic's foreign trade turnover.

The country became particularly aware of the role of the state transport sector with the start of the undeclared war unleashed against the republic by imperialism and regional reaction. At the time, some people from among the private truck owners, incited by counterrevolutionary organizations that had built their nests in Pakistan drove their machines beyond the cordon and made attempts at sabotage. The main burden of transporting freight was assumed by AFSOTR. The Soviet side provided Afghanistan with several hundred MAZ and KamAZ vehicles on preferential long-term credit conditions. And today the joint stock company primarily transports economic freight. When it is necessary to "take" a consignment of foodstuffs, necessities or to deliver materials for facilities under construction, the powerful container trucks of AFSOTR sally out on the road.

The company's dispatchers are truly architects of transport, arranging and organizing the shipment process, giving it rational forms--schedules, routes,--binding with strong thread the interests of shippers of freight into Afghanistan and clients, including private entrepreneurs.

We drive out onto the extensive grounds of the company's motor transport enterprise. An entire complex for the maintenance and repair of trucks is set up in its shops, filled with modern equipment. At the machine shop we speak with Aminulla Muhammad Shah, a brigade leader of lathe operators--his picture is on the enterprise's board of honor. The lathe operator was awarded a medal for conscientious labor. He shows us a pennant and testimonials.

"We try to work with initiative," Aminulla says. "The Soviet comrades teach us this."

AFSOTR is truly a school of national cadres--of drivers, machinists, mechanics--for there is a shortage of them in Afghanistan. Soviet specialists act as instructors and teachers. In a collective of almost 2,500 there are a little more than a few dozen of them. But their role is great.

"Very close friendly and work relations exist between Afghan and Soviet specialists," D. Zazai says. "The enthusiasm and determination with which Soviet people pass on experience to us, introduce advanced methods of work organization and try in every possible way to convince us: they truly want us to stand firmly on our own feet as specialists."

We find Valeriy Ivanovich Yushko, a representative of the Minsk Motor-Vehicle Plant, in the instruction class. He is conducting together with engineer Abdula Basir classes for upgrading drivers' qualifications. Their instruction between trips is one of the methods of improving the commercial indicators of the joint stock company's operation.

The occupation of a driver in Afghanistan, where roads pass mainly through mountain ranges and passes demands not only high vocational skills, it is today an occupation of brave and courageous people. A memorial to fallen drivers, located on the grounds of AFSOTR, serves as an eloquent testimonial of this. One hundred sixty of them have been killed at the hands of bandits.

deserted place on the route. Aref only stepped on the gas. The machine was fired on. The driver was killed.

Muhammad Dyl was forcibly taken out of the cab and driven into the mountains. He was able to inform his comrades where his MAZ stood with its valuable cargo. They succeeded in driving the machine away to Kabul under the nose of the bandits. The prisoner was killed in reprisal.

Driver Islam was a recent victim of armed robbers. He was fired on. Wounded he succeeded in bringing the truck to Kabul. He is now being treated in a hospital.

And still, despite dushman terror, Afghans eagerly go to work for AFSOTR--it is prestigious and profitable. Here progressive forms of pay are in operation, and, for Afghanistan, it is high. Drivers and mechanics know what cost and economy of fuel mean and take part in a labor competition. And are social and living conditions an unimportant factor? Here you have an excellent dining room, a medical station, showers, motion picture room and a kindergarten. Products from its own poultry farm are received at the cooperative store at state prices. Features of tomorrow's Afghanistan are seemingly taking shape at the company's enterprises. Such is the assessment given them by General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Chairman of the DRA Revolutionary Council B. Karmal on visiting AFSOTR's personnel.

of Whatman paper with drawings by children of Afghan and Soviet colleagues. This exchange among young artists and the coincidence of their thoughts and themes, as if reflecting the concerns of their fellow-worker fathers, is astounding. Doves on the earth's globe, two-wheeled trucks, golden-horned rams dance among the flowers. Words drawn with a light hand: "Long live peace in Afghanistan and throughout the entire world!" This reveals the innermost thoughts of Muhammad Husein, son of a party-member driver, who died at the hands of bandits in his machine with an AFSOTR travel sheet.

And today tens and hundreds of the company's trucks move along serpentine mountain roads to make his dream a reality.

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MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA/SOUTH ASIA

USSR-LIBYAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Moscow FOREIGN TRADE in English No 3, Mar 86 pp 18-19

[Article by Vladimir Fitin, Executive Secretary of the Soviet part of the Intergovernmental Soviet-Libyan Commission for the Development of Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation and also Trade: "USSR-Libya: Horizons of Cooperation"]

[Text]

The friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Libya are consolidating and diversifying with each passing year. The firmness of these relations was proved by the official friendly visit to the Soviet Union of Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi, leader of the Libyan revolution, in October 1985. During the visit negotiations on a wide range of questions were held and a number of important Soviet-Libyan documents signed. Speaking about the character of the Soviet-Libyan ties M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, told M. al-Gaddafi: "These relations have long-standing traditions and are rich with manifestations of deep sympathy and mutual respect between our peoples."

The Soviet Union values highly the progressive course pursued by the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya both on the world arena and at home and watches with interest how the targets set by the

Libyan leadership in economy are realized. The most important among them are to diversify industry and create its optimum structure, to accelerate progress in agriculture aimed at achieving full self-sufficiency in foodstuffs and necessary raw materials, and to train skilled national personnel in order to gradually eliminate the need for the foreign specialists.

Soviet-Libyan cooperation makes a noticeable contribution to accomplishing these tasks. Soviet organizations have worked out a number of policy-making documents which in many respects defined the development of such important sectors of the Libyan economy as the power and gas industries. For instance, during the implementation of the Scheme for the Development of High Voltage Electricity Supply Networks to create Libya's Unified Power Grid before 1995 the Soviet Union helped build 220-kV power transmission lines (total length 190 km), and

another 460 km of power transmission lines are under construction. Under the General Scheme for the Comprehensive Development of the Libyan Gas Industry up to the Year 2000 Soviet organizations completed the construction of a large gas pipeline stretching 570 kilometres along Libya's Mediterranean coast from Marsa-el-Brega to Misureta.

The soil and ecological research done by Soviet specialists over an area of 3.5 million hectares and soil maps drawn and also geological maps of Libya's territory over an area of about 100,000 square kilometres are of great importance for analyzing resources available in Libya and for developing the respective industries.

The Tajura Atomic Research Centre, a symbol of mutually beneficial Soviet-Libyan cooperation, is functioning successfully; Soviet and Libyan specialists continue joint research and development at the installations of the Centre, the largest in the Arab countries. Of no less importance is the fact that in Libya's key economic sector—the oil industry—Soviet organizations have been carrying out drilling operations since 1979, and in 1985 they conducted major research connected with studying and preparation of recommendations on developing one of Libya's oil-fields.

The projects built and operations done have created a stable foundation for furthering cooperation between the two countries, and the level achieved has put on the agenda the question of continuing it on a qualitatively new, long-term and large-scale basis. This is confirmed by the Long-term Programme for the Development of Economic, Scientific and Techni-

cal and Trade Cooperation between the USSR and Libya, signed by M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and M. al-Gaddafi, the leader of the Libyan revolution, on October 14, 1985. The Programme mapped out the main spheres of cooperation between the two countries up to 2000 and the longer term.

The document signed formalized the sides' intentions to promote cooperation in construction, and to expand and modernize industrial and other projects in such traditional sectors as the power industry (including nuclear one), the oil and gas industries, geology, agriculture, and health care. The Programme also lays down new trends of cooperation, in particular mechanical engineering, chemistry and petrochemistry, forestry, and the construction of dams and irrigation projects.

The country's industrialization plans adopted in Libya provide for building a number of large projects and in some cases the creation of new industrial sectors. First of all, new plants will be built in the iron-and-steel industry and mechanical engineering.

The largest projects of cooperation in the coming years may be the second stage of the iron-and-steel complex in Misureta, the nitrogen fertilizer factory in Syrte, thermal power plants, new gas pipelines and underground gas storage tanks and enterprises of the machine-tool, tool-making and electrical industries. In connection with this, provision is made for possible participation of Soviet organizations in the construction of

new high-voltage power transmission lines, geological mapping of Libya's territory, prospecting for natural resources, building of railways, and soil and ecological research, among other things.

An important distinguishing feature of the signed Programme is coordination of new forms of cooperation. Collaboration is planned in selling and acquiring patents, licences and know-how, in rendering services in marketing the products manufactured, in conducting joint research and development, etc.

Taking into account the special importance of the accelerated training of skilled national personnel for Libya, provision is made for wider cooperation in this field, including training and qualification upgrading for specialists and scientists at all levels.

An understanding was also reached on more active preparation and realization of joint projects in third countries and on furthering mutually advantageous commerce on a long-term, equal and balanced basis. It is planned to carry out scientific and technical cooperation within the framework of the two-year concrete programmes now under preparation. The depth and range of the planned scientific and technical cooperation can be judged by the main

areas of cooperation, which include electronics, laser and computer facilities, biotechnology, the latest methods of prospecting for natural resources, etc.

On the whole, the Programme has mapped out the guidelines of Soviet-Libyan trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation and will serve as a beacon for the long term. The Intergovernmental Soviet-Libyan Commission for the Development of Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation and also Trade was instructed to control and help tackle problems which can arise in the course of implementing the said Programme; the Commission will regularly consider the whole set of problems defined in the Programme.

At present both countries' organizations are facing the task of concretizing and implementing the understandings reached at the summit level. The Guidelines of the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for the coming 15 years provide for the continuation of the gradual implementation of coordinated long-term programmes of trade, economic, scientific and technical ties with developing countries. The signing of the Long-Term Programme with Libya marked the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in promoting Soviet-Libyan large-scale cooperation.

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MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA/ SOUTH ASIA

SOVIET-ALGERIAN ECONOMIC, TECHNICAL TIES

Moscow FOREIGN TRADE in English No 3, Mar 86 pp 20-22

[Article by Vadim Shamovsky, Chief of the Department of Economic Cooperation with the Near East Countries, USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations: "USSR-Algeria: Mutually Beneficial Relations"]

[Text]

Economic and technical cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria has a leading place in the two countries' relations which is evident from the results of their more than 20-year cooperation in this sphere.

The Soviet-Algerian first agreement on economic and technical cooperation, signed December 1963, was the starting point of the two countries' planned and dynamic economic relations which are in full conformity with the course Algeria enunciated for developing its independent economy and establishing and consolidating its state sector.

Soviet economic assistance to the young republic includes the construction and rehabilitation of state-owned industrial enterprises, the prospecting for and the mining of mineral resources, development of the water economy and training national specialists.

Over the past years built with Soviet assistance and successfully operating are a steel-making plant and a wire-manufacturing workshop, two coke-oven batteries, a blast furnace and a converter shop at the El Hadjar iron-and-steel plant, Algeria's heavy industry's firstling which meets the country's full requirements for coke and a considerable portion of steel and rolled metal. To supply the eastern part of the country with electricity a 55 MW thermal power plant was built in Annaba. Metallic mercury producing enterprises (total output exceeds 300 tons per year) were built in the region of Azzaba and also a dressing factory near El Abed to process annually 680,000 tons of lead and zinc ore. A section of the Tin

Fouye-Hassi Messaoud gas pipeline (length 421 km) has been put into temporary service. The construction and subsequent expansion of a window glass works in Oran doubled Algeria's glass-making capacities and made it possible to supply approximately one-third of the country's requirements for sheet glass.

Soviet specialists participate in prospecting for solid mineral resources and they have already discovered large deposits of iron ore, barytes, mercury as well as some non-ore minerals.

Oil and gas exports are the country's main sources of currency receipts. In 1971 all Algeria's oil resources, which previously had been in the hands of oil monopolies, were nationalized. Foreign engineers and technicians left the country.

To help Algeria the Soviet Union sent a large group of oil specialists with drilling equipment to prospect for and produce oil and gas. Soviet specialists also assisted in R&D, consulted and advised on the ways to improve prospecting methods in the search for and production of oil and gas. This assistance made it possible to maintain the current level of hydrocarbon production and raise considerably the output of natural and associated gas.

Since 1963 the sides have been cooperating in agriculture, a subject of great importance for accomplishing the social and economic tasks facing the republic. One of the main problems in this sphere is to provide semi-desert and desert lands in the Algerian Sahara with drinking water. During the years of this particular cooperation some 200 wells have been sunk making it possible to irrigate thousand hectares of arid lands and palm-growing plantations, supply more than 100,000 people with drinking water and even develop cattle-breeding. Four irrigating dams have been built to Soviet designs and the fifth is under construction. Soviet specialists-consultants are working for the High Commissariat responsible for developing the steppe zones of Algeria and helping set up veterinary services and grain-producing farms, etc.

Cooperation in developing the health services is in full swing. Since 1963 many Soviet medical teams have been working at dozens of Algeria's hospitals.

The training of Algerian specialists has special importance in the two countries' economic cooperation.

More than 20 years have gone since the USSR and Algeria signed their first intergovernmental Agreement on building and equipping the National Institute of Oil, Gas and Chemistry in Boumerdes which the Soviet Union presented to the Algerian people as a gift. Later the USSR helped set up the National Institute of Light Industry in

Boumerdes, the Mining and Metallurgical Institute within the system of Annaba University and the Hydro-amelioration Institute in Soumaa. These educational establishments have already trained more than 12,000 highly capable engineers and technicians for the oil and gas industries, metallurgy and mining, the light industry, water economy and other sectors in Algeria's economy. At present nearly 1,500 Algerian students and post-graduates are studying at higher educational establishments in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Baku and other Soviet cities, and more than 1,000 specialists from Soviet higher schools are teaching in almost all large university centres of Algeria.

Algeria, which had chosen the road of independent economic development, felt an acute shortage of skilled workers, first and foremost in the country's main economic sectors—metallurgy, the mining, oil, light and other industries and also the water economy. The Soviet Union rendered assistance in solving this social and economic problem. Soviet specialists helped build, expand and equip more than 30 educational centres, of which the first, the centre in Bordj El Bahri, to train specialists for the textile industry and agriculture is worthy of mention; it has been functioning for more than 20 years. Educational centres have also been set up in Annaba to train specialists for the mining and iron-and-steel industries, in Ain-Taya to prepare geologists, in El Khemis to train maintenance staff for motor vehicles and construction machinery. Farm machine operators are studying in the towns of Setif, Batna, Tiaret and Mascara.

This list can be lengthened. All in all for the years of cooperation more than 40,000 skilled workers and foremen have been trained for industry and agriculture. In Algeria, for many years now a large group of Soviet teachers and foremen have been rendering assistance in organizing the educational process at vocational training centres.

Soviet specialists also train local specialists during the construction and operation of Soviet-Algerian cooperation projects. At present negotiations are under way on building and equipping 20 more Algerian vocational training centres.

One of the most traditional and priority spheres of Soviet-Algerian economic and technical ties is now the training and education of Algerian nationals.

The present stage of economic and technical cooperation between the USSR and Algeria is characterized not only by its many-sided and planned development but

also by the use of new forms that take into account the real capabilities of each side. To cite an example, two sections of the Alrar-Hassi Messaoud gas pipeline (length more than 650 km), which was commissioned late 1985, were constructed by Soviet organizations on general contract terms.

On the same terms a contract was signed in 1984 on the construction of a thermal power plant (630 MW) in Djidjelli. The contract gives Algerian firms the opportunity to undertake some construction work which will promote their wider participation in implementing the country's economic development plans. On the basis of Soviet technical documentation Algerian construction organizations have started fulfilling work of immediate importance at this site.

Soviet-Algerian economic relations are based on mutual benefit and do not contain any unequal, burdensome terms, including political, for Algeria. Soviet assistance to Algeria as well as to all other developing countries cooperating with the USSR has one object—to help these countries establish their own independent economies. Noting the young republic's difficulties, the Soviet Union repeatedly granted credits to Algeria. In April 1985 the two countries signed a new intergovernmental agreement giving credit to Algeria to pay expenditures of Soviet organizations building industrial, water economy and other projects envisaged in the second five-year plan of Algeria's social and economic development. And taking into account the Algerian side's financial difficulties connected with reduced exports of Algerian goods, first and foremost oil and gas, to the industrial capitalist countries, the Soviet Union agreed that the credits can be partly repaid with Algerian products of interest to the Soviet Union. This step will undoubtedly increase the volume of Soviet-Algerian trade and promote relative industries in Algeria's economy.

The scales reached in Soviet-Algerian ties do not exhaust all the available possibilities. The high level and friendly nature of Soviet-Algerian relations and many-sided active links between the two countries create a sound basis for furthering economic cooperation in the various sectors of Algeria's economy on a mutually advantageous basis with the aim of consolidating its economic independence.

The volume of economic cooperation with Algeria in the Soviet 12th five-year plan period (1986-1990) is to increase about 40 per cent as against the previous five-year period. Cooperation will be able to progress in agriculture and the water economy, the infrastructure,

the oil, gas and petrochemical industries, in the construction of new and streamlining of the operating iron-and-steel projects, in geological prospecting, in expanding building material capacities, civil engineering, and in training specialists. These main directions of the country's economic development are envisaged in Algeria's second five-year plan of economic and social development for 1985-1989.

The Permanent Intergovernmental Soviet-Algerian Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation and its working bodies make great contribution to implementing the projects and furthering economic cooperation between the two countries. One of the main trends in the Commission's activity is to find prospective projects for cooperation. For example, at its tenth meeting the Commission pinpointed the cooperation projects for the new five-year plan period and subsequent years with account of Algeria's possibilities and development plans.

Among them mention may be made of a number of spare part-producing workshops at the El Hadjar iron-and-steel plant, two small-section and a medium-section mills, a refractory factory, a forging works, plants manufacturing metal structures, glass works in the region of Djelfa, the Benizid, Tilezdit, Hamman-Bougrara, Zit-Emba and Bou-Rahman irrigation dams. These projects also include a few institutions such as the Electrical Engineering Institute in Sidi Bel-Abbes, the Civil Engineering Institute in Tebassa, the Institute of Mechanics in Lag-houat. The plan provides for Soviet specialists' assistance in modernizing and reconstructing the Haoud El Hamra-Snikda 385-kilometre oil pipeline and building a 600-kW hydro-electric power station among other projects.

The Commission's working bodies are continuing their activities on concretely defining cooperation projects ready for the eleventh meeting to be held within the first six months of 1986.

Cooperation between the USSR and Algeria is of great importance for consolidating Algeria's economic independence, for implementing its plans of social and economic development. The projects built with Soviet assistance become the state's property which creates the prerequisites required for increasing the influence of state

regulation, for carrying out social and economic reforms, for strengthening Algeria's positions in its struggle with foreign monopolies and for facilitating Algeria's independence in international economic relations.

Soviet-Algerian economic and technical cooperation is based on the sides' equality, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, observance of sovereignty, and meets the interests of both countries' peoples and social progress.

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

BRITAIN'S TORY, LABOR GOVERNMENTS' AFRICAN POLICIES ANALYZED

Moscow NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 86 pp 35-48

[Article by V.M. Tatarintsev: "England's Policy in Africa (the Seventies and Early Eighties)"]

[Excerpts] The last decade and a half have been marked by a further diminution of Great Britain's role in the international arena and a weakening of its influence in the capitalist system. In terms of economic indicators it is fifth among the powers in the West, having being overtaken by the FRG, France and Japan in terms of volume of industrial output, its exports have noticeably declined, and there has also been a decline in British private investment abroad, including that in the developing states. [1]

At the a same time Great Britain remains one of the leading capitalist powers and retains considerable weight and influence in the world and in international relations, and is one of the main elements of capitalism's neocolonialist system, particularly on the African continent where English monopoly capital occupies quite solid positions and moves as an active defender of the West's interests. [2]

However, under the conditions of change in the balance of power in the world in favor of socialism and the national liberation movement, and the deepening in the general crisis of capitalism and the further exacerbation of interimperialist contradictions and the growing role of the liberated countries in the international arena, British imperialism is actively seeking new ways and methods to adapt to this situation and is making attempts to "improve" neocolonialist means and methods, including in its policy in Africa. It states in the draft for the new CPSU Program that "as it pursues a policy of neocolonialism, imperialism is striving to emasculate the sovereignty gained by the young states and even intensify its control over them."

The various aspects of England's policy in Africa in the Seventies and early Eighties have been to some extent considered in a number of collective and monograph studies by Soviet scholars. This applies primarily to collective work done by scholars at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Africa, where they have dealt, in particular, with Anglo-African relations and the nature of the factors affecting them [3] and the deterioration of these relations during the early Seventies. [4] Important theses have also been put

forward in studies conducted by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations, as, for example, the fact that under present conditions, in order to realize its neocolonialist aims in former colonies, England is making active efforts to adapt to the changing situation in the world arena [5], or work on the essential nature of British strategy and tactics in the south of Africa. [6]

The aim of this article is to provide a counterbalance to the insinuations of bourgeois authors in the West concerning the true idea of the class essence, main directions and features of British policy in Africa during the period under review. The more so since this period has not been covered fully and completely in Soviet history literature.

Great Britain's foreign policy in Africa during the Seventies can be divided into two stages, while in the late Seventies and early Eighties it enters a third stage, which still continues today.

The essence of the first stage (the early Seventies) is that during those years British ruling circles essentially proclaimed and started to pursue a course aimed at strengthening ties with the Republic of South Africa and the previous fascist regime in Portugal in order to strengthen resistance to the growing national liberation movement on the continent and to pursue a line toward prolonging the extraction of enormous profits by British monopoly capital through the plundering of African peoples; and a new attempt was also made to "legitimize" the racist regime of I. Smith in Southern Rhodesia, thus causing a considerable exacerbation of the contradictions between the former home country and the independent African states.

Britain's policy in Africa during the second stage (1974-1979) was largely determined by the serious changes taking place in the world and on the African continent, and also by the profound crisis events developing in the capitalist economy which were particularly baneful for the situation in Great Britain.

The third stage, whose foundation was laid in the late Seventies, is distinguished by the considerable "shifts" to the right in Britain's African policy and toward a hardening of a course showing marked signs of elements of aggressiveness and the broader use of direct pressure, gross interference in the internal affairs of independent states, the further intensification of open cooperation with the Republic of South Africa, and Great Britain's more active participation in the agreed strategy adopted by the West, led by the United States, in Africa, based on open anticommunism and anti-Sovietism.

Within the framework of the first stage the policy of British imperialism was determined by the changes that had taken place in the balance of power in the world arena in favor of socialism and the national liberation movement, the growing trends toward the relaxation of international tension, the consolidation of the positions of the liberated states, and the exacerbation of the domestic situation and the deepening of social-class contradictions in Britain itself under the influence of the general crisis of capitalism and Britain's reduced role in the world in general and in the capitalist system in particular.

After E. Heath's Tory party came to power in 1970 the government formulated the main directions of British imperialism's African strategy. First, jointly with the United States, Britain was to continue to provide for the "defense" of the sea lanes about the Cape of Good Hope; second, it was to maintain its economic positions in the independent countries of tropical Africa and in the southern part of the continent; third, in accordance with Heath's own formula, it was to "maintain peace and stability in the southern part of Africa by means of encouraging a gradual, evolutionary change" in the situation, which essentially meant the need to achieve the goal of weakening or undermining the national liberation movement in that region; and fourth, it was "to prevent or restrain the growth and expansion of communist influence in the subregion." [17]

The course of closer military and political cooperation with the Republic of South Africa was expressed in the intention of E. Heath's government to renew supplies to the apartheid regime and to abandon the restrictions imposed by the previous Labor government of H. Wilson. With this action, British ruling circles moved into open confrontation with the independent states of that continent and evoked a sharp reaction from most members of the [British] Commonwealth. In 1971 the Organization of African Unity characterized the plans of the Conservatives as "a flexing of British political muscle and a new approach of gunboat diplomacy." [20]

At the same time Great Britain made active attempts to end South Africa's political isolation, which it covered with assertions that it was essential to "normalize" the situation in the south of Africa; which in fact would be in the interests of British monopoly capital and of the racist regimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. By this co-called "normalization" the Heath government meant primarily an end to the national liberation struggle in that part of the continent and the retention and actual recognition of the regime of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa. It actively advocated "dialogue" between the Republic of South Africa and the independent African states and conducted extensive propaganda among the latter and exerted direct pressure on them, especially Swaziland, Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, Kenya and Uganda. [21]

The British ruling circles and the regime of apartheid, however, failed to achieve any weakening in the struggle by African states and the national liberation movement, and in creating their own kind of buffer zone between the independent states on the one hand and the racist regimes and the Portuguese colonialists, on the other.

At the same time, in the former home country, relations with Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda became especially tense; the leaders of those countries severely criticized the Conservatives' policy in Africa, primarily because of the intention to renew military supplies to the Republic of South Africa and the attempts to resolve the Rhodesian problem on the basis of retaining the superiority of the white minority. These countries condemned Britain's plans during personal contacts with the British prime minister E. Heath and in the speeches of their representatives at the 1971 Commonwealth Conference, and they threatened to withdraw from that organization. It was not happenstance that already by 1972 the Heath government was trying to normalize relations

with Zambia and Tanzania in order to head off their criticism of British policy at the next Commonwealth Conference in 1973. But it was not only political considerations that underpinned these efforts. By 1973 a trend could be clearly seen indicating the growing role and importance for Great Britain of economic cooperation with the independent African countries. In particular, trade relations with them were acquiring increasing importance compared with the Republic of South Africa. Thus, imports from the Republic of South Africa totaled 180 million and 196 million pounds sterling in 1965 and 1972 respectively, while imports from the African countries that were members of the Commonwealth amounted to 316 million and 408 million pounds sterling respectively. [25]

These trends helped to strengthen attitudes among the ruling circles and monopoly capital favoring a continuation of stable relations with all the independent countries of Africa and the establishment of cooperation with those countries in the economic and political spheres.

In addition, the Conservatives began to be seriously alarmed by the successes of the national liberation struggle by the peoples of the Portuguese colonies and the prospects for them achieving national independence, taking into account that British monopoly capital had quite extensive interests in those countries, particularly Angola and Mozambique. This forced Britain's ruling circles to change their tactics. It was becoming increasingly clear that the line being pursued by British imperialism toward strengthen the alliance and cooperation with Portugal in Africa had begun to lose some of its importance. It was not by chance that Great Britain was forced to agree to a provision contained in the final document of the 1973 Commonwealth Conference stating that "the members of the Commonwealth will try to use all their influence to move Portugal to guarantee independence to its African colonies." [26]

The inevitability of Great Britain's adaptation of its African policy to the changing conditions was seen mostly in the latter half of the Seventies. In 1974-1975 a profound world economic crisis rocked the capitalist system, significantly exacerbated the fuel and raw materials and currency and financial problems of the West and activated the class struggle; and as a result the Heath government was forced to resign and call general elections in 1974; and at these elections it suffered a major defeat.

At this stage a substantial effect was exerted on British policy in Africa by the process of the relaxation of international tension, which created favorable conditions for intensifying the national liberation struggle by the peoples and enhanced the role and importance of the liberated states in the world arena. The Portuguese colonial empire disintegrated, testifying to the strength and scale of the national liberation movement on the continent of Africa.

The profound changes taking place in the world, the serious economic crisis, the like of which England had not seen since the Thirties, and the associated growing dependence of the British economy on supplies from African countries of most kinds of valuable raw materials, including those of military-strategic importance, and the urgent need to resolve the Rhodesian problem, which had complicated relations with independent states on the continent, on whose

stability the uninterrupted supplies of imports of raw materials from Africa largely depended, presented the Labor government with a need to review its policy in Africa and to be more attentive and flexible in its strategy.

For the Labor government the main task was, in order to comply with the social instructions of monopoly capital, not to allow any further weakening of the British positions in Africa. [29] The Wilson-Callaghan government accompanied a widely publicized statement on a "new" African policy with vigorous actions aimed at encouraging British private investment in Africa. With the help of a special law passed in 1972 concerning overseas investments and export guarantees, by late 1975-early 1976 the Department of Export Guarantees had reached agreement on providing private British capital for 34 different projects in Kenya, the Congo, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia and the Republic of Seychelles. [30]

The loss of the "ally" of the fascist regime in Portugal presented the Wilson-Callaghan government with new problems in the sense of the search for new approaches to the realization of imperialist, neocolonialist strategy, particularly in the south of the continent. In this situation the ruling circles set a course toward closer coordination of their efforts in Africa with the United States, and toward working out joint actions with it, particularly on the problems of the south of the continent and the conflict situations in the Horn of Africa, the Western Sahara, Zaire, Chad and other places. Britain began to show a marked interest in cooperation in Africa with the member countries of the European Economic Community.

At the same time British imperialism switched from showing openly hostile attitudes toward the national liberation movements on the continent, primarily in the south of Africa, to declarations of support for them and establishing with them the necessary links and contacts from the standpoint of "British interests," and conducting appropriate negotiations, particularly on the Rhodesian and Namibian problems. Thus, at the 1975 Commonwealth Conference Great Britain was forced to agree to the inclusion in the final document of a clause on the need to support the national liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies and the provision of "humane" aid for them. [31]

The Rhodesian question created considerable difficulties for the propaganda support of the widely publicized Labor government course toward "reorientation" of British policy in Africa and assertions that the long-term interests of Great Britain were supposedly linked not with the Republic of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia but with the independent states on the continent. The more so since in the mid-Seventies the OAU set itself the strategic task of focusing the main attention of the organization on providing aid and support for the struggle by the peoples of Southern Rhodesia and Namibia to achieve their independence.

In this situation British ruling circles began to make statements to the effect that they were in favor of a handover of power in Rhodesia to the black majority and for the removal of the Smith regime from power in that country. The foundation of this tactic was essentially laid in a statement by Callaghan in March 1976, and this was subsequently used as a basis for the amended Anglo-American "initiatives" on the Rhodesian problem in 1977 and 1978. [35]

At the same time attempts were made include certain African countries in the realization of the Anglo-American "initiatives," and extensive diplomatic activity took place. In fact, however, it turned out that the Labor people were trying to resolve the Rhodesian problem on a neocolonialist basis, place a collaborationist government in power, maintain the superiority of the white minority in that country, and safeguard Britain's interests.

Under the cover of statements about the importance of developing cooperation with the independent African countries and limiting ties with the Republic of South Africa, and critical statements aimed at the regime of apartheid, the Labor government pursued a line aimed at developing multifaceted links and contacts with the Republic of South Africa and in fact cooperated with the British monopolies in increasing their capital investments. Great Britain remained the chief contributor of capital and the main importer of goods from South Africa. [36] In this connection the British newspaper THE FINANCIAL TIMES wrote: "Great Britain's aims are clear. She is interested in maintaining her economic positions in Black and White Africa for as long as possible." [37]

In 1979 M. Thatcher's Conservative government came to power in Great Britain. It was precisely at that time that the activity of imperialist circles in the West was intensified against the relaxation of tension. They set out on the road of extensive confrontation with the world socialist system, initiated an arms race unprecedented in scale, intensified subversive activity against the national liberation movements, and set a course toward destabilization of progressive regimes.

Britain's policy on this plane is distinguished by increased aggressiveness against the African states, extended use of means in the tactical arsenal such as direct pressure, blackmail and attempts to consolidate its military presence and involvement of recently independent countries in the arms race.

The Conservative cabinet not only approved the United States' creation of its "rapid deployment force" and the expansion of the network of U.S. military bases in Kenya, Somalia, Egypt and Morocco but in 1983 even announced the formation of its own similar forces in the form of the 5th Airborne Brigade, numbering 5,000 men, to carry out actions to interfere in the internal affairs of states whose policies are not to the liking of British imperialism, and to conduct operations to "safeguard" British interests. The British prime minister assessed highly the actions of the French government which, in her opinion, had responded to an "appeal" by African states and sent its troops to that continent and she suggested that British, French and U.S. naval forces be combined in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. [40] The head of the Conservative cabinet also appealed for support for the U.S. "rapid deployment force" in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. [41] Under cover of statements about the Soviet threat" and clumsy accusations that the USSR was responsible for the exacerbation of tension in the Indian Ocean, the Conservative government tried to increase Britain's military presence in that zone, sending British warships there. [42]

In connection with the increased aggressiveness in Tory policy there was even greater exacerbation of the contradictions between Britain and the African

countries on the Namibian question in which in their approach the Conservatives continue to cooperate closely with U.S. imperialism. Although, fearing openly to further complicate relations with the countries of Africa, the British ruling circles are losing monopoly capital's powerful positions in Namibia, they are trying to show that in this case they are playing the role of "intermediary" between Washington and the independent states of the continent and are being more careful in their approach to the question of "linking" resolution of the Namibian problem with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, proposing that both matters be discussed "in parallel."

At the same time the Conservatives are supporting the U.S. "initiatives" on Namibia and they recognize their "value" since they see in U.S. imperialism the main force for exerting influence on Pretoria in connection with the resolution of the Namibian question, and they are essentially in agreement with the line chosen here by the United States. [43]

Anglo-African contradictions are assuming an even more acute nature in connection with the Conservative government's policy regarding the regime of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa. While they condemn the policy of apartheid in words, in fact they continue to cooperate actively with it, especially in the economic field. Here, Britain is completely ignoring international and African public opinion, which is insisting on the imposition of comprehensive sanctions against the Republic of South Africa because of its aggressive actions against neighboring countries and its refusal to comply with the UN resolution on Namibia. Suffice it to say that compared with 1980, in 1981 British exports to the Republic of South Africa rose 24 percent. [44] And in 1981 it became known that Great Britain had not only not halted its cooperation with the Republic of South Africa in the nuclear field but had even entered into an agreement to hold "consultations" on matters of nuclear power engineering, thus helping the racists to conduct research in this field. [45]

Nevertheless, voices are being raised among Britain's Conservative circles criticizing certain actions by the Republic of South Africa, which reflects the trend toward exacerbation of the contradictions between the regime of apartheid and Britain. In 1981 former secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs Lord Carrington condemned the actions of the Republic of South Africa with respect to Angola and insisted that the Republic of South Africa comply with the Security Council resolution on Namibia. [46] The then undersecretary of state for foreign affairs in Great Britain, R. Luce, also thought that the policy of apartheid is a danger to the maintenance of "peace" in Pretoria itself and is threatening Great Britain's trade and strategic interests. [47]

This testifies to the presence of forces among the influential representatives of the Conservative Party who think that in the present situation the policy of the Republic of South Africa in Africa is in some cases at variance with the interests of British monopoly capital. In order to protect their positions on that continent, including in the Republic of South Africa and Namibia, these forces often have to express their disagreement with any of Pretoria's plans and actions that might harm British interests, which in the

final analysis introduces an element of tension into relations between the two countries.

Under present conditions the Tory cabinet has been forced to consider in its African policy the growing importance of British economic, political and military strategic interests in the countries of tropical Africa. Former British secretary of state for trade and industry S. Parkinson, for example, said that Britain must take into account in its policy the balance of interests that has been established in Africa and that it should not lose its important trade links throughout the continent, particularly in Nigeria. [49]

The present British government is paying more attention to maintaining and expanding bilateral contacts with the ruling figures in the African countries, seeing in stable relations with the countries of that continent a very important means for pursuing its neocolonialist strategy. The African policy of the Conservative government is also distinguished by a marked enhancement of the role of the ideological factor. A special place is given over to anticommunism and anti-Sovietism as a means of weakening the influence of the states of the socialist community in Africa and of foisting on former colonial peoples a capitalist path of development.

The Conservative government is acting as one of the organizers of the West's coordinated opposition to the world socialist system. It is actively pursuing a line of intensifying the anticommunist and anti-Soviet campaigns in African states, grossly falsifying the essential nature of Soviet-African relations and the positions of the countries of the socialist community on Africa's most important problems. [50]

Thus, Great Britain's policy in Africa in the late Seventies and early Eighties has been noticeably influenced by a whole set of factors that are forcing British ruling circles to seek out even more intensely ways and means of improving their neocolonialist strategy and tactics in order to keep the independent states within the orbit of the capitalist system and in a position of dependence on the former home country on the basis of consolidating the unequal nature of their relations.

In summing up, we stress that during the period reviewed British policy in Africa has undergone definite evolution. British ruling circles have continued their persistent attempts under changing conditions to shape the kind of system of political, economic, cultural and diplomatic relations with the African states that would to the greatest degree meet the aims and tasks of British monopoly capital. The chief of these is not to permit any further change in the balance of power in Africa such as could finally undermine the position of British imperialism.

The neocolonialist aspirations of British governments, particularly Conservative governments, have shown the doomed nature of British imperialism's claims to empire in pursuing its policy in Africa from a position of force, interference in the internal affairs of independent countries, and foisting upon them its own approaches in resolving the continent's urgent problems. The events of the last decades testify to the futility of such a course with regard to the developing state given present

international relations, and they have forced British ruling circles to seek out roundabout ways and engage in attempts to disorient the peoples of Africa.

In British policy in Africa in the late Seventies and early Eighties there has been no slackening of the struggle between two trends. One of them is seen increasingly in the forced recognition by sober-minded British ruling circles of the serious changes on the continent and in the world in general and in their attempts to adapt to them, and in this connection amend their African policy in certain ways; while the other trend is seen in the desire of those representing the far right wing of the ruling class in Great Britain to ignore the changes that have taken place, and in their intention to be guided mainly by the old imperial yardsticks in their African policy.

Life, however, testifies to the bankruptcy of both trends in Britain's policy in Africa. This is confirmed by the deepening contradictions between the former home country and the independent states of Africa, the intensifying national liberation movement in the south of the continent, and the growing struggle by the African peoples against imperialism and neocolonialism and to liquidate the vestiges of colonialism and racism.

The entire system of relations between Britain and the independent African states has in recent years been of an increasingly crisis-type nature. Within this system the lack of accord between the ambitions and claims of monopoly capital to restore Great Britain's world role and the realistic opportunities available to the former home country can be seen in clear relief.

Today British imperialism must take into account the growing role of the liberated African states in the international arena as they act persistently to pursue an independent course in the world arena. But the essential nature of the problems remains the same: British imperialism's policy is incompatible with the true national interests of the African peoples and is aimed at perpetuating imperialist domination, continuing the pillage and exploitation, and increasing tension in Africa and throughout the world.

FOOTNOTES

1. Whereas in 1950 Britain's share in the GNP of the capitalist countries was 7.5 percent, in 1960 the figure was 6.3 percent, in 1970 some 4.8 percent, and in 1979, just 4.2 percent. During the same years its share in world capitalist production was 8.7, 7.6, 5.9 and 4.4 percent respectively. Great Britain's share in exports from the West was 10.8, 9.1, 6.9 and 6.2 percent respectively for the same years. See "Great Britain." Moscow, 1981, pp 10-11.
2. Britain's direct private investments in Africa total \$15-\$17 billion, including \$10 billion in the Republic of South Africa, that is, more than other Western powers. See Anat. A. Gromyko. "Konflikt na Yuge Afriki" [Conflict in the South of Africa], Moscow, 1979, pp 29, 39; and Ye.S. Khesin. "Angliya v ekonomike sovremennogo kapitalizma" [Britain in the Economy of Modern Capitalism], Moscow, 1979, p 338.
3. "Vneshnaya politika stran Afriki" [The Foreign Policy of the African

Countries], Edited by Anat. A. Gromyko. Moscow, 1981.

4. "Neokolonializm i Afrika v 70-kh godakh" [Neocolonialism in Africa in the Seventies], Moscow, 1975.
5. "Mezhdunarodnyye konflikty sovremennosti" [Present-day International Conflicts]. Edited by V.I. Gantman. Moscow, 1983.
6. "Great Britain." op. cit.
17. "Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. Official Report, 6 Jul 1970," col. 399.
20. "The OAE and Arms Sales to South Africa." Addis Ababa, 1971, p 7.
21. "Africa Contemporary Record. Annual Survey and Documents. 1971-1972." London, 1982, p A91.
25. "Africa Contemporary Record. Annual Survey and Documents. 1973-1974." London, 1974, p A56.
26. "Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting 1973. A Year-Book of the Commonwealth." London, 1974, p 211.
29. In 1967 the share of British private investments was as follows: Botswana, 88 percent; Gambia 87 percent; Ghana 59.1 percent; Kenya 78.8 percent; Lesotho 60 percent; Malawi 92.7 percent; Nigeria 53.8 percent; Sierra Leone 84.4 percent; Swaziland 96.6 percent; Tanzania 46.7 percent; Uganda 48.1 percent; Zambia 79.6 percent. "Multinational Firms in Africa." Edited by C. Widstrand. Dakar, 1975, p 84.
30. "Africa. Britain and the Developing Countries." London, 1977, p 11.
31. "Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting. Final Communiqué." Kingston. 6 V. 1975, pp 4-6.
35. "British Plan To End Rhodesia Crisis. Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. 22 March 1976." col 29-44; "Rhodesia. Proposals for a Settlement." London, 1977, p 4.
36. Thus, 1974 Callaghan announced that the Labor Party and government were against apartheid and racism, which were causing tension in relations with the Republic of South Africa. THE TIMES 6 Feb 1974. D. Owen pointed out that opposing racism was not only a moral duty for Britain but was also in its long-term interests. "Africa Contemporary Record 1977-1978, p A85. Whereas in 1969-1973 Britain's investments grew 61.6 million pounds sterling, in 1974 alone they increased 179 million [pounds sterling]. J. Woddiss. "South Africa." London, 1976, p 5.
37. THE FINANCIAL TIMES 23 Sep 1977.
40. THE TIMES 30 Jan 1981.

41. "Africa Contemporary Record. Annual Survey and Documents 1980-1981."
London, p A161.
42. Five British warships were attached to the U.S. armada in the Indian Ocean region as long ago as 1980. Moreover, Britain's warships constantly "patrol" the Gulf of Oman.
43. "Africa Contemporary Record. Annual Survey and Documents 1981-1982."
London, 1982, p A51.
44. Ibid., p A247.
45. London ANTI-APARTHEID NEWS April 1981, p 5.
46. THE FINANCIAL TIMES 23 Sep 1981; INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE 6 Oct 1981.
47. "Africa Contemporary Record 1981-1982." p A246-A247.
49. "Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). House of Lords. Official Report"
26 Mar 1981, col 1265.
50. Late in 1980 the Tories formulated their own concept of "global strategy" for the West under the conditions of their invented "global threat" from the USSR, which would allegedly increase the "military presence" in Africa. The essence of the "concept" is to intensify confrontation with the USSR and frighten the countries of Africa with the "communist penetration which is creating a threat to the interests of peoples on the continent," and to develop an anti-Soviet campaign and involve African countries in it. "A Global Strategy To Meet Global Threat. A British Initiative." London, February 1981, pp 2, 9, 10-14, 15-16.

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16 May 1986

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

NEED SEEN FOR SOUTH AFRICAN WHITES TO 'RECONSIDER' POSITION

MB120446 Moscow in Afrikaans to South Africa 1747 GMT 11 Apr 86

[Commentary by Carol Smith]

[Text] Recently about 2,000 white South African youths reported to the SADF Headquarters as required by law. The continuation of military conscription indicates that the apartheid regime wants to escalate the war against the majority of the citizens of South Africa, as well as against the people of Namibia and the neighboring states in southern Africa.

For many years many whites considered the war as something very remote from them, something which did not involve them. But over the past 10 years, white South Africans have become aware that they are living in peril. Thousands of families now sit and wait for news of their sons, brothers, and husbands. All are affected by the interference caused by the military callups.

To enjoy the fruits of apartheid is one thing, but to risk one's life in the defense of apartheid is quite another, and now the specter of war is at their doorsteps. During the past year, the resistance of the South African patriots has made many parts of the country ungovernable.

(?Resistance) groups to fight racist troops and police have been established in the black areas. These are organs of the people's own government. The apartheid regime can no longer hide the reality of the war, and in addition to that, the (?people) say the ANC wants to take the war into the white areas.

What does this signify? The whites are very worried, but, as we all know, the banned leaders of the ANC have said the ANC does not want to harm innocent people, and will not use the methods of the police are using against our people in the ghettos.

The ANC carries out military actions, but these actions are aimed at the police and the Defense Force. The ANC's fighters attack arms depots, oil depots, transport and communications which support the apartheid military system. The whites can now see the people's demonstrations in front of their homes. They will feel the boycotts, which will spread throughout the country. Many whites will become bankrupt.

Now is the time for the whites to reconsider their position.

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CSO: 3401/120

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS' EFFORTS TO COMBAT DROUGHT DESCRIBED

Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 13 Apr 86 p 3

[Article by V. Onuchko: "The Firing Ranges Should be Quieted"]

[Excerpt] In the beginning of the current year two events took place on the African continent which perhaps did not attract the particular attention of the world public. None the less, for the Africans they were connected with the most serious problem which has not been dropped from the agenda for the last decade and a half. We are talking about the most severe drought to hit the countries of the southern Sahara--the Sahel.

In the Senegalese capital of Dakar the 7th conference of heads of states of the Standing Interstate Committee for Combatting the Drought in the Sahel (SILSS) was held. In another part of the continent, in Djibouti, the founding assembly took place of a new regional intergovernmental organization for combatting the drought and for development of the countries of Eastern Africa. Like the SILSS, this organization has in front of itself the tasks of hastening the economic development of the region by struggling with the drought and desertification of the land.

The peak of the most severe drought in 1983-1984 affected 27 African countries and the negative consequences affected practically every third African. The 7th conference of heads of state of SILSS in its appeal to the international community pointed out the effects of the drought for the region: desertification of land, worsening of soil productivity, lack of correspondence between the demographic growth of the population and the economic development of the countries, increased financial dependence and the ever deepening indebtedness of the African states. Therefore, the representatives of the countries participating in the conference turned to the international community with the request to render material aid to the countries of the region in fulfilling their plans of combatting the attacks of the desert and for their agricultural development.

Specialists are sure that the at one time most productive Sahel is not yet hopelessly lost to Africa as a source of life for millions of people of several dozen nationalities. But its revitalization requires capital investments of almost \$700 million a year up until the year 2000. In the current economic situation, when the foreign debt of the African countries to Western creditors

has increased 10 percent since 1985 alone and has reached the colossal sum of \$174 billion, this task cannot be handled by Africa herself.

The suggestions put forward by the Soviet Union on the struggle of the developing countries with poverty, hunger and epidemics--this disgrace of civilized humanity--were clearly contained in the materials of the 27th CPSU Congress. The neocolonialist exploitation, disastrous condition and indebtedness of the "third world" can be mitigated by constructive, creative mutual action of states and peoples on a world scale, for which the Soviet Union calls.

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END